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Introduction 
The papers in this volume are the fruits of the Third Romanian Studies 
Day, held at SSEES in January 1995. The impulse for this one-day 
conference was the fiftieth anniversary of the Yalta Conference and the 
lessons for Romania. Among the topics discussed are the hopes 
entertained from Yalta, especially after Romania’s volte face of August 
1944, the misconceptions arising from the percentage agreement of 
October 1944 between Stalin and Churchill, and British attitudes 
towards Romania in the period 1944 to 1947. 
Yalta became shorthand for the post-war division of Europe which 
suddenly disappeared in the passage of a year, from autumn 1989 to 
autumn 1990. Peter Siani-Davies offers us the first detailed account in 
English of the events in Timisoara, which sparked off the downfall of 
Europe’s worst dictator and brought an end to that post-war division 
even closer. It is fashionable to consider that the end of the Cold War 
consigned Yalta to history. Yet questions still arise from Yalta which 
are vaild today. Will there continue to be circumstances in which the 
major powers are unable or unwilling to prevent the imposition of 
dictatorship, the expulsion of ethnic minorities, and the disintegration of 
states? At Yalta the three governments committed themselves to help 
‘liberated peoples’ achieve ‘democratic self-government’. Is there a 
danger today of these powers underwriting ‘undemocratic’ settlements 
in the name of uneasy alliances? This is a concern that lies behind Elena 
Zamfirescu’s paper when she suggests that the division of the former 
Soviet satellite states of Europe into Central and East European (or 
Balkan) states leads one to think about ‘a possible resumption of the 
policy of “spheres of influence’”. Charles King, by taking the example 
of the Moldovans, demonstrates just how politically charged linguistic 
labels are in the post-Communist period where the effort to construct 
new national identities is a feature of political life in Central and 
Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. 
What most of these papers share is their destruction of a myth. Ivor 
Porter, a member of a three-man British team parachuted into Romania 
in December 1943 to make direct contact with pro-Allied Romanians, 
describes with the self-effacement typical of a truly courageous figure, 
and with a dry sense of humour, how sensitive King Michael was to the 
exigencies of Realpolitik. This is a picture quite removed from that of a 
powerless, timid youth presented in Communist historiography. Dennis 
Deletant demolishes the myth of the sole Communist authorship of the 
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23 August coup by highlighting the role of the King and of the 
opposition parties. Maurice Pearton challenges the popular image of the 
percentage agreement of two old men carving up Europe like a cake. He 
shows that the truth is far more complex, as indeed is the case with 
British-Romanian relations in the immediate post-war years. Mark 
Percival reveals that the opposition parties wanted general 
parliamentary elections put off as long as possible in the hope that 
Soviet troops would be withdrawn in the meantime! How far Elena 
Zamfirescu succeeds in destroying the ‘myth’ that Romania is an East 
European country is for the reader to decide. To argue that Moldovan 
identity is a myth is to presume that there is agreement as to what 
Moldovan really means. Charles King provides an admirable discussion 
of the radically different conceptions of ‘Moldovanness’ held by 
political groupings in the republic. 
Without the organizational abilities of Radojka Miljevic and Mark 
Percival, the contributors to the Studies Day would not have been 
assembled. This volume is testimony to the efforts of both organizers 




The Coup of 23 August 1944: 
Personal Recollections of an SOE Mission’ 
IVOR PORTER 
At the end of December, 1943,1 went into Romania on an SOE mission 
to Juliu Maniu with Colonel de Chastelain and Captain Metianu. We 
were arrested and spent the first eight months at the Gendarmarie 
Headquarters in Bucharest. We were released on the 23rd of August. By 
the end of the year I had left SOE and returned to a more regular life on 
the staff of the British Political Adviser; and the small Romanian 
Communist Party was beginning, under Moscow’s critical eye, to flex its 
muscles. 
In this piece I should like to say something about our rather odd 
relationship with the Antonescu authorities while in prison and about the 
coup, itself. My memory is, of course, bolstered by hindsight and a better 
understanding now of what was happening then than I had at the time. 
We were ignorant, for instance, of the Teheran conclusions and still half 
hoped for an Allied landing in the Balkans. We understood the vital 
contribution the Red Army was making by 1944 to victory over Hitler but 
failed to translate this into a requirement to satisfy all Stalin’s ambitions 
in Romania. We, therefore, saw contradictions in our policy which we 
should not have seen. We exhorted Romania to carry out a volte-face 
against Germany as a means, in Churchill’s words, of ‘working her 
passage home’. But we knew that for people like Maniu ‘home’ meant 
some type of Western democracy, not the unconditional surrender to the 
Soviet Union we were insisting should follow the coup. We had not 
realized that by 1944 expediency had become a necessary and, therefore, 
justified rule in our war councils, the Atlantic Charter a bit of an 
embarrassment, Maniu’s reminders of our 1940 war objectives an irritant. 
Queen Helen once noted in her diary ‘News from the Allies confirms ... 
that this country does not interest them except as an enemy’. There was 
truth in this that for us was difficult to accept. For Maniu it was 
impossible. 
When SOE learned that Maniu was sending out an emissary to meet 
Allied representatives, our mission was despatched to prepare him for the 
shock of having to deal — not with Britain — but, in effect, exclusively 
with the Soviet Union. When, in October 1943, the Moscow meeting of 
Foreign Ministers had removed the little room for political manoeuvre left 
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to Britain in Romania, de Chastelian questioned the point of our mission 
at all. But London insisted. Chas, they thought, might persuade Maniu, an 
old friend, to accept the inevitable. Whether or not they were right, we 
shall never know. For instead of becoming Maniu’s advisers in some 
comfortable safe house, we became Antonescu’s advisers in a 
Gendarmerie prison. 
I shall not go into the technical reasons for our failure to reach Maniu 
on 22 December 1943. Enough to say that we were relieved when the 
NCO escorting us to a small gendarmerie near Rosiori de Vede told the 
villagers ‘sunt prieteni’. We hoped to elude the Germans by making a 
quick dash to the capital and to that end told the local authorities that we 
had a message for the Romanian government. We had no such message, 
but this story was published in the Turkish press and gave London more 
trouble with the ever suspicious Molotov. For us it served its purpose and 
by early next morning we were in Gendarmerie Head Quarters at 
Bucharest. 
According to Colonel Teodorescu, Head of Gendarmerie Security, our 
arrival for Christmas had upset all their holiday arrangements. He asked 
us about our trip, and told us that, until a flat on the top floor had been 
prepared to house us permanently, we would have to make do in the 
cadets’ sick room. He was disciplined and kind and in 1949 became a 
casualty of the Communist regime. I had a long telephone conversation 
only a few months ago with his widow. 
We knew that according to Maniu, Antonescu, being an honourable 
man, would one day make amends for the harm he had done his country 
and it seemed to us that this moment was now approaching. Within 
twenty-four hours of our arrival in Bucharest the Marshal had informed 
de Chastelain through his close collaborator Vasiliu, Under-secretary at 
the Ministry of Interior with responsibility for the Gendarmerie, that he 
would protect us from the Germans. Churchill had intervened on our 
behalf but, in any case, Antonescu would see in us a useful potential link 
with the Allies. The German Minister, Manfred von Killinger, was to 
make several unsuccessful demarches for our removal to Germany. Even 
Hitler intervened. But Antonescu stuck to his guns and as late as 15 June 
von Killinger again raised the matter and was told that the Marshal’s 
decision was final. 
Antonescu warned us not to give the Germans any pretext for 
claiming that we had come in to sabotage oil. Otherwise they would have 
a valid reason for taking us over. Mihai Antonescu (known as lea), his 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and an international lawyer, would 
help us draft our declarations. We wrote three drafts before lea was 
satisfied. At one point, during the interrogation, the Romanian authorities 
were even giving us advance notice of Berlin’s follow-up questions. 
We agreed with the Romanians to tell our German interrogators that 
we had come in on a short, fact-finding forage. To Vasiliu, Chas had 
admitted the true purpose of our mission but without disclosing any 
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names except that of Maniu himself. And Maniu, being Maniu, had 
already been to see the Marshal to accept full responsibility for us. 
We had handed over our cyanide tablets without any sense of loss. We 
felt that given our privileged position with Vasiliu and with General 
Tobescu, Head of the Gendarmerie, we might still justify our mission by 
persuading Antonescu to conclude an armistice. We argued that no 
separate agreement with the Western Allies was possible, that Germany 
did not deserve Romania’s loyalty and that the sooner Romania 
contributed to the Allied war the better would be her prospects at the 
peace settlement. They replied that, rather than submit to the Russians, 
the Marshal would fight on. However, he was very willing to co-operate 
with Western forces when they arrived. In March I noted in my diary five 
accounts of landings of Western troops in the region. Some would be 
pure wishful thinking, others a part of the Allied deception strategy. 
But Antonescu played an active part in the approach to the Allies. 
When Maniu’s first choice of envoy had been turned down by lea as a 
Titulescu man, Antonescu suggested the experienced, clear-headed 
negotiator Prince Barbu Stirbey. And when the talks got under way in 
Cairo, he asked for an independent line of communication with General 
Wilson, Commander in Chief in the Middle East. We were delighted. He 
would use the transmitter we had brought in, and we obtained permission 
from SOE to provide him with a cypher and to cypher and decypher 
telegrams for him. 
The Marshal’s first telegram included such phrases as the ‘bottomless 
pit of shame’. We thought it maudlin and Chas told Vasiliu that London 
was, in any case, sick and tired of these requests for guarantees against 
the Russians. Vasiliu would not shift, and we were about to despatch the 
telegram when Captain Petermann — our German interrogator — 
dropped in and stayed during the W/T scheduled period. The following 
day, we tried again, only to find that the crystals controlling the set’s 
transmitting frequency were missing. Cristescu, head of the Siguranta, 
had, in fact, given them to the Germans. Since the Marshal thought his 
telegram had already gone, the matter was becoming urgent. On Sunday, 
2 April, de Chastelain was taken to meet Maniu at the Baneasa woods. 
They had a long, confidential talk during which Chas persuaded them to 
allow the Marshal to make use of his illegal radio. When, therefore, on 13 
April, telegrams containing the armistice terms were sent separately to 
Maniu and Antonescu, they were both handled by Maniu’s wireless 
operator. Maniu’s was decyphered and passed to him. Antonescu’s was 
handed to Mihai Antonescu who took it to Vasiliu, who gave it to us for 
decyphering. Incidentally, both telegrams passed through the hands of 
Rica Georgescu, a collaborator of Maniu’s who operated from a cell in 
the Siguranta’s high security prison. We sent Antonescu a memorandum 
urging him to accept these terms before they were withdrawn. But they 
contained one sentence that could be read as leading to Soviet 
occupation. Antonescu, furious, refused even to acknowledge the 
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telegram. Maniu suggested negotiating on the text. Because he associated 
Stirbey with the hated Bratianu regime of the 1920s he never quite trusted 
his envoy and put down to incompetence the latter’s inability to carry out 
his impossible instructions. He still believed in a special relationship with 
Britain, despatched telegrams for British eyes only, describing his 
mistrust of the Russians, telegrams which were automatically copied to 
Moscow. By the end of the month the Cairo talks had to all intents and 
purposes collapsed. 
Meanwhile, the Germans took Antonescu’s involvement in all this in 
their stride. They panicked Bucharest by summoning the two Antonescus 
to Germany, only days after Hungary had been occupied while Horthy 
was at Berchtesgarten. But they felt pretty sure of their man and, in any 
case, as Ribbentrop remarked to lea, ‘In their relations with Russia the 
British have gone beyond the point of no return and nothing will come of 
the Stirbey mission.’ 
On the night of the coup King Michael told us that he had been ready 
to act since the early spring but that the political parties had been slow to 
make up their minds. From the journals of Queen Helen and General 
Sanatescu, head of the King’s Military Household, I now know more 
about this. On 23 March, the day the Antonescus left for Germany, the 
King asked General Sanatescu to sound out Opposition leaders and 
friendly generals about the possibility of an immediate anti-German 
volte-face. This was not the first time and their reaction, according to 
Queen Helen, was always the same. ‘All swear fidelity and offer their 
hearts and souls and life but the moment Michael appeals to them all 
retire gracefully saying if only one had told them before but this certainly 
isn’t the moment.’ One reason for their reticence was the high number, as 
they thought, of German troops in Romania. Maniu’s estimates were 
based on the number of rations claimed by the German authorities, 
which, for obvious reasons, were greatly inflated. On this occasion 
Antonescu told the King on his return that there were virtually no 
German troops in the country at that time. But by then, the moment for 
action had been missed. During the next five months the King and his 
group continued to meet at Foi§or in Sinaia, or Casa Noua in Bucharest or 
at Savar§in where they were less exposed to Antonescu’s spies, working 
on what Queen Helen calls the ‘serious plan’, the one that was eventually 
put into action. 
On the evening of 22 August de Chastelain was called down. Vasiliu 
described the disastrous position on the front. Mihai Antonescu, who was 
more flexible than the Marshal, would go to Cairo to make peace with the 
Allies. Would de Chastelain accompany him? Chas agreed on certain 
conditions to be discussed in the morning. 
Next morning, however, we could not contact Vasiliu. He was 
attending Antonescu’s last cabinet meeting at Snagov. Nor did we know, 
of course, of the afternoon meeting in the Casa Noua at which the 
Marshal, by insisting that he would do anything rather than break with 
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the Germans, triggered the coup. During the ten o’clock news that 
evening listeners were warned to leave their wirelesses on since an 
important message would follow and we almost turned ours off to avoid 
another pep talk from the Marshal. Then we heard the King reading his 
proclamation. The guards balanced their rifles against the wall and drank 
a glass of wine with us. Duty officers came up to celebrate. At eleven we 
were taken to the Palace through a cheering crowd, all lights on for the 
first time since the air raids started in April. I met Mircea Ionnifiu, the 
King’s secretary, a man I would grow to like and respect during the next 
few years. The room was crowded and we were in a bit of a daze after 
eight months of incarceration. When we asked General Sanatescu, the 
new prime minister where Maniu and Bratianu were, he told us he had no 
idea. We talked to Titel Petrescu and Lucrefiu Patra§canu. We were 
introduced to King Michael and after months of government propaganda 
found his assessment of the situation very refreshing. He seemed mature 
for his age and completely his own man. He had had a clear 
understanding of the damage Antonescu had done the country and had 
been determined to stop it. Like Carol I, he seemed to have a better feel 
for the reality of power politics than his Romanian advisers — and in 
particular what could reasonably be expected of the Allies. 
I met Maniu next morning. What struck me most about him — apart 
from the warmth of his smile — was the fact that his attitude to the war 
seemed quite unchanged. His envoy, he complained, could never speak 
freely since the Soviet representative was always present. With 2,000 
British parachutists, Romania could have broken with the Axis while the 
Russians were still beyond the Prut. Western influence could have been 
restored, he told me, in Eastern Europe. 
Since the Palace was being systematically bombed, Rica Georgescu, 
Niculescu-Buze§ti, I and others moved to the vaults of the National Bank. 
There we set up Maniu’s transmitter and again sent messages to Cairo. 
We gave them enemy troop positions, and confirmed the King’s need for 
air support — which he got on the 25th in a massive American raid. The 
King, with Mircea Ionnifiu, had left during the night for Craiova and 
beyond. Other members of his group stayed in Bucharest. Chas had gone 
to Istanbul to report. Many Ministers had moved to a village outside 
Bucharest. The plans to cut German communications and take control of 
key institutions worked well. Local Romanian units held the Germans 
until troops could arrive from the front. The Romanian air force won the 
battle of Bucharest. We left the vaults on the 27th and I set up an office in 
town. When the Russians marched into the capital on the 31st, flags 
flying, bands playing, the whole region had been cleared by the 
Romanian army. 
Looking back now to that period, it seems clear that by August 1944 
Romania’s position had become desperate whichever road she took. Had 
she followed Antonescu and Hitler to the end, she would have become a 
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battlefield and, at the peace settlement it is doubtful whether 
Transylvania would have been restored to her. 
She took the alternative route, a risky volte-face which offered no 
guarantee of success or, were it successful, of recovering any credibility 
with the Allies. As important as its military success was, in my view, the 
King’s restoration of the 1923 constitution and a government determined 
to fight for free elections was more important. It took Stalin over three 
years to destroy organised democratic resistance in Romania where he 
was forced, in Churchill’s words, to show ‘the pattern of things to come’. 
The coup made provision for a return to Romanian democracy, which 
could only have been secured with the help of massive Western 
intervention. Nevertheless, it was the single most determined effort made 
in Romania between 1938 and 1989 to break out of a cycle of 
increasingly corrosive and degrading dictatorships. 
2 
Puzzles about the Percentages 
MAURICE PEARTON 
I encountered the ‘percentages agreement’ first when reading Triumph 
and Tragedy at the time of the book’s appearance, in 1954. The date is 
important, insofar as I read the account of the transactions in Moscow in 
October 1944 (Chapter XV) without the benefit of the subsequent 
polemics. My reaction at the time was that the ‘agreement’ was, in 
essence, an attempt by Churchill to pin Stalin down to some limits, in a 
situation in which the only restriction on Russian influence in the Balkans 
was the Red Army’s operational problems. This was — and remained — 
a distinctly minority view. Elsewhere, and especially in the United States, 
it was condemned as a cynical deal between two big Powers at the 
expense of a small state, excusable, if at all, only on the grounds that this 
is how big (European) Powers always behave. In Romania, comment was 
muted; among the emigration, and now in Romania itself, the 
‘agreement’ is simply regarded as a ‘betrayal’. 
In all the argument, it was never made quite clear what specifically 
was the nature of the ‘betrayal’. Churchill himself was clear and 
consistent. In Chapter XIV he writes, ‘I had never felt that our relations 
with Romania and Bulgaria in the past called for any special sacrifices 
from us.’ There was, thus, in his mind no undertaking towards Romania 
which any arrangement of the kind contemplated would violate. The Red 
Army had been in Romania for two months; it could not be expelled and 
clearly was not minded to withdraw. Earlier, in May 1944, Churchill had 
mooted the idea of a temporary division of spheres of action with the 
Russians over the Balkans.1 So what happened in Moscow the following 
October was no improvisation. 
Churchill’s account, as expressed, might be clear and consistent; it 
might also be inadequate, in that it presents the ‘percentages agreement’ 
entirely in terms of Anglo-Soviet relations, to which considerations of 
Romania simply had to yield. In my view, the context is too narrow. That 
has skewed the discussion ever since and turned inquiry largely into a 
debate about the merits, or otherwise, of Realpolitik, principally from a 
moral, or moralizing, standpoint. So I would like to propose an 
alternative argument. 
See E.L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. IV, 
London, 1971, p. 115. 
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During 1944, the prospect of victory intensified the strains between 
the Allies, but there was some practical rapprochement between their 
views on Romania. The dictatorship of Antonescu, the Iron Guard 
movement, the pogroms of 1941 all made it easy to conclude that 
Romania had not only joined the Axis for reasons of foreign policy but 
had brought its institutions and social policies into line with those in 
Germany as well, Participation in the invasion of the Soviet Union, with 
aims which the setting-up of Transnistria clearly demonstrated, finally 
stamped Romania as a ‘Fascist’ state, albeit with some German and some 
Italian characteristics. 
In Britain, this was the dominant view; the arguments of those who 
knew of the dilemmas and ambiguities attending Romanian policies 
counted for very little. Government, and hence the military authorities, 
focused on Romania as a unit in the Axis system and how, if at all, it 
could be prised loose. As long as the stream of German successes 
continued, this question was academic but the attitude does demonstrate 
that Romania was not regarded as an entity in itself but as part of a wider 
problem — the strategies governing military operations and, relatedly, 
relationships with the Russians. 
They, of course, had long-standing suspicions of the Romanians as a 
people incapable of gratitude for the Russian blood shed in procuring 
their independence from Ottoman rule. More recently, they had filched 
Bessarabia from Russia and now had provided Germany with troops and 
transit to invade Russia. Furthermore, in setting up Transnistria, they had 
created a place of relative order, under proclaimed Romanian 
sovereignty, and one which had attracted Russian and Ukrainians living 
outside. In this way, its existence provided damning evidence of the 
weakness of the Soviet system and of the ineffectiveness of twenty years 
of propaganda and coercion. Victory would give an opportunity for a 
settling of accounts. 
The Americans at this stage had no special views about Romania, 
except insofar as Ploesti offered a number of worthwhile targets. At the 
same time as Churchill’s mind was moving towards ‘percentages’, 
American diplomats in Moscow were weighing up measures to get the 
Soviet Union to define its intentions. Averell Harriman, the Ambassador, 
writing to Cordell Hull, recording his fear that Russia intended to set up a 
sphere of influence in the Balkans (20th September), said: 
It can be argued that American interest need not be concerned over the affairs 
of this area. What frightens me, however, is that when a country begins to 
extend its influence by strongarm methods under the guise of security, it is 
difficult to see how a line can be drawn.2 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. IV, Washington, 1956, p. 
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George Kennan, newly returned to Moscow, proposed the determination 
‘in conjunction with the British, of the line beyond which we cannot 
afford to permit the Russians to exercise unchallenged power’.3 This 
thinking was unacceptable to the Administration. It was — and continued 
to be — anxious to avoid getting drawn into ‘the Balkan trouble centre’ 
and into ‘the longstanding rivalry between Great Britain and Russia’. 
The Americans did, however, have a doctrine of war which 
maintained that operations had nothing to do with politics, but should be 
determined strictly by military criteria.4 They were, also, determined that 
Europe should be liberated by invading Germany from the west, to meet 
the Red Army invading from the east. On these grounds, they rejected 
Churchill’s ideas about a strategy based on the Mediterranean, 
considering them not only diversionary but as cloaking wicked 
hegemonial motives. Such American suspicions of the British were 
matched by a total unwillingness to upset the Russians. 
In strategic terms, Romania’s fate was settled at Teheran. It is highly 
significant that the Conference took place five months after the battle of 
Kursk had given the Red Army a wider range of options, which it 
successfully exploited during the summer, advancing an average of 150 
miles on a front 600 miles in length. By November, its bridgeheads were 
established on the western bank of the Dnieper. This spectacular military 
success enhanced Stalin’s position at the Conference. He happily joined 
the Americans on issues which divided them from the British. Churchill’s 
ideas of an alternative strategy were ditched, and the opportunity to get 
British and American troops into the Danube before the Red Army never 
was to materialize. The details of this strategy and the likelihood of its 
success are still contentious issues among historians; what is beyond 
argument is that American insistence on the ‘west-east’ strategy ensured 
that Stalin would be able to make his writ run wherever the Red Army 
advanced. The fundamental problem for the Western Allies thereafter 
was what limits would Stalin observe, or could be persuaded to observe, 
on the freedom of action conferred on him at Tehran. Their arguments, 
unlike his, could not be backed by military force in Eastern Europe. In 
these circumstances, they could either acquiesce in Stalin’s claims, on 
grounds of the demands of Soviet security, or they could try to conclude 
See W. Isaacson and E. Thomas, The Wise Men, New York, 1986, p. 239. 
This was not just West Point teaching, but was deeply rooted in the culture. The 
dissociation of power and policy ‘is most marked in America’s traditional 
conception of war and peace as diametrically opposed states of affairs, to be 
governed by entirely different rules and considerations without regard for the 
continuity of political conflict. With the country at peace, foreign policy has 
been formed and executed with little regard for considerations of military 
power; but with the country at war foreign policy has been largely suspended 
and immediate military considerations have been dominant. Typically, ... the 
determining objective has been to obtain a clear-cut definitive military victory 
in the most effective manner as quickly as possible.’ Robert E. Osgood, Limited 
War. The Challenge to American Strategy, Chicago, 1957 [emphasis added]. 
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limiting agreements with him, to which he could be held in the future. In 
the event, they tried both. 
The British had long defined their essential interest in the Balkans as 
keeping Salonika and the islands out of the hands of a major European 
power. They approached Balkan questions from the south. What varied in 
the pursuit of this objective was how far up the peninsula it was 
necessary to exercise influence in order to protect the littoral. In the same 
order of thinking, it was held absolutely vital to keep Russia from 
commanding the Straits. This particular perennial of the ‘Eastern 
Question’ surfaced again in 1944. Churchill himself speculated that 
Russia had broader ambitions for bringing not only the Balkans under 
Communist rule, but Italy as well. Foreign Office opinion scouted this 
apprehension on the grounds that Russia’s own problems of 
reconstruction would require her to cooperate in a security system in 
which the principal element would be the continued subjection of 
Germany. 
At this point, Romania entered the argument. In January 1944 the 
British reported to Moscow the arrest of the British agents parachuted 
into Romania the previous month. The Antonescu government used the 
occasion to put out peace feelers to Britain. The Russians did not 
comment substantially till April, when Molotov accused Churchill of 
trying to reach an agreement with Romania behind Russia’s back. This 
response provoked a first-class row, in the course of which the Foreign 
Secretary, Eden, put to the Soviet Ambassador the suggestion that the 
Russians ‘should temporarily regard Romanian affairs as mainly their 
concern under war conditions while leaving Greece to Britain’. He had 
tried the idea of operational demarcations on the Russians in 1942, but 
without success. Now the Soviet Government accepted the idea but 
inquired if it had been cleared with the United States. It had not, and 
Britain’s belated approach to Washington drew a prompt refusal, then 
followed by acceptance but for only three months. Eden then asked the 
Russians if they were still interested; they replied that they were giving 
the matter further consideration. It was thus left in the air. 
This was a messy business. The British grossly midhandled their 
exchanges with the United States and succeeded only in exacerbating 
American suspicion of their motives, but it is doubtful whether, even with 
more careful preparation, their proposals would have been acceptable. 
Roosevelt and his entourage were already taking the view that any 
trouble in the postwar world was likely to emanate from the British rather 
than the Russians. Moreover, they were not, in any case, going to adopt 
any position putting the President’s re-election in November at risk. An 
Administration which made a virtue out of its hostility to ‘spheres of 
influence’ could not afford to condone its ally’s behaviour. In June, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff ruled that no American forces were to be sent into 
any part of the Balkans, Hungary or Austria. 
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Then, on 23rd August, occurred the coup which ended Romania’s 
subservience to the Axis and permitted the Red Army to advance swiftly 
not only into Romania but also into Bulgaria. This later move 
significantly improved the threat to the Straits — the Eastern Question in 
the air age. The seizure of Bulgaria, after a contrived four-day ‘war’, was 
not considered in isolation in London. By that time, the Russians had 
installed the Lublin Committee in Poland, had allowed the Warsaw 
Rising to go down to defeat, and done little to help the Slovaks in their 
revolt. Russia appeared to be relying on the Germans to eliminate any 
possible non-Communist leaderships and thus clear the way for 
Communist rule. When would the process stop? 
Churchill decided to take the initiative with Stalin. He hoped that, 
Teheran notwithstanding, Allied military progress in Italy would allow 
British and American troops over the Brenner Pass and into Austria by 
this time. That did not, in fact, happen. Stubborn German resistance, 
appalling weather and the Americans’ insistence in withdrawing their 
crack divisions for the invasion of southern France all slowed down the 
Allied advance. Churchill went gloomily to Moscow, thinking that 
American obduracy would, after all, allow Stalin to get what he wanted. 
There Churchill proposed, as he reported in Chapter XV of his ‘personal 
narrative’, divisions of influence in South-Eastern Europe during 
hostilities in terms of percentages. The bargaining produced a final ratio 
of 90:10 in favour of the Soviet Union as regards Romania (the quid pro 
quo was Greece). The Romanian ratio was no improvisation but was in 
line with long-term British assessments, now made more acute by the fact 
that the Red Army had already been in Romania for two months. 
Much ink and more anguish have been spent over this particular 
episode. For the British, it was a commonsense solution to a problem 
which followed from the unmistakable demonstration at Teheran that the 
Americans were determined to run the war their way, and in accordance 
with their strategic presuppositions, and that there were severe limits to 
what Britain could do to influence their ideas and attitudes. Over and 
above protecting the position in Greece, the ‘agreement’ was intended to 
ascertain how far Stalin’s Balkan ambitions ran and pin him to an overt 
indication of them which might, if necessary, be the basis of future 
bargaining. Churchill himself underlined this aspect when he insisted that 
the percentages were only guidelines during hostilities and were subject 
to review at a peace conference. Considered in these terms, the 
‘agreement’ was an attempt by him to stop the attrition of British, and by 
implication American, rights and interests in South-Eastern Europe, and 
foreseeably Italy, at a juncture when he could expect no help from the 
Americans, if not the outright hostility he was to encounter only a few 
weeks later over Greece. On these grounds, it was held that the 
‘agreement’ helped to stabilize a situation which was dangerous because 
too fluid. However, the manner in which this outcome was achieved 
attested to the displacement of Britain within the Alliance. 
12 PUZZLES ABOUT THE PERCENTAGES 
The displacement continued at Yalta. There, the position in Romania 
and Bulgaria was not specifically raised, but the transitional nature of the 
existing arrangements was confirmed in the Declaration on Liberated 
Europe. The Western leaders focused on other priorities; Churchill, on 
Poland, Roosevelt on a condominium with Russia in the Pacific as an 
inducement to Stalin to enter the war against Japan, and on Soviet 
membership of the new multilateral security organization. Above all, the 
future of Germany and reparations dominated the European agenda. Yalta 
was not the place at which any significant change in Romania’s position 
could be advocated. That change came within a month of the Crimea 
meeting, when the combined efforts of the Soviet Government, the Red 
Army and the Romanian Communists procured the imposition of a 
Communist-dominated government in Bucharest, over vigorous protests 
from the US and more restrained ones from Britain, whose officials’ 
drafting reflected the ‘agreement’ on percentages. 
It has, in consequence, had a central place in the polemics ever since. 
In that context, it is commonly portrayed as a cynical allocation of 
territory by two ‘Great Powers’. The arguments deployed above suggest a 
different reading. It was an attempt by the weaker of the two Western 
Allies, at a time when its relations with its stronger partner were 
acrimonious5 and were rapidly reaching their nadir, to put limits to the 
spread of Communist control and Communist influence in areas which 
the agreed strategy had consigned to the Red Army. As such, it was an 
early exercise in what later became known as ‘containment’. For 
Romania, it was too late to try to establish a limit on the river Prut. Then 
and thereafter, the Soviet position in Eastern Europe could only be 
overturned if the Western Allies were prepared to fight — which they 
were not. So the only way of alleviating pressure on Romania was to deal 
with the power exercising it. That was the logic behind ‘percentages’. 
Until the end of the hostilities, British officials felt constrained by the 
‘agreement’ of 9th October, but one may note that the Americans, who 
were not party to it, behaved in much the same way. The plain fact was 
that neither state could exercise the degree of leverage demanded to make 
Stalin give way over Romania. The record of Red Army and Romanian 
Communist actions soon showed that for him Romania was a special 
case; the accounts had to be settled. That was more than a matter of 
revenge. What the Western Allies did not know, was that, in the autumn 
of 1944, before the Moscow meeting and before Yalta, Party activists had 
been touring Soviet factories pointing out that the impending defeat of 
Germany did not mean the end of Fascism; Fascism was a function of 
capitalism at a certain stage of its development, and the struggle would 
have to go on as long as capitalism existed in Europe. So, better times for 
5 In the United States, attacking Britain was one way of attacking the 
Administration in the then current electoral contest, without risking accusations 
of lack of patriotism. 
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the Russian people would have to be postponed. This doctrine, if applied 
to Romania, could only imply not a ‘bourgeois’ government responsive 
to Soviet wishes — roughly what the British had hoped for — but 
outright Communist rule. 
Many Romanians clung to the hope that Allied policies towards Italy 
would provide a useful analogue for their own country. They did not 
grasp that the obvious similarities — the overthrow of the dictator, the 
change of sides, intervention on the Allied side — masked a wholly 
different position for Romania in Allied strategy, as settled at Teheran. 
Romania’s position in 1944-45 rested not on Churchill’s ‘percentages’ 
but on the ‘west-east’ strategy for destroying the military power of the 
Third Reich. As far as the Russians were concerned, the key factor was 
not what happened on 23rd August, but what had taken place between 
June 1941 and that date. Romania had aligned itself with Germany and 
Italy, and had been their faithful and effective ally thereafter. The coup of 
23rd August did not cancel out Romania’s participation in the invasion of 
the Soviet fatherland; Romania’s repentance was only tactical; it would 
have to bear the consequences. At the core of this attitude was a 
recognition that Romanian arms had been successful and that Transnistria 
had been the evidence of that success. That was intolerable. 
Any charge of ‘betrayal’ which can be made against British policy is 
not that ‘percentages’ allowed Russia into Romania — after Teheran 
there was nothing the British could do to prevent that — but that 
thereafter British officials, both wittingly and unwittingly, led pro- 
Western Romanians into thinking that ‘the new democracies’ were 
prepared to do something effective about the Soviet occupiers and their 
Communist proteges, when they were not. At that time, of course, the 
British were still thinking in terms of an orthodox peace conference, 
where the situation could be rectified in a general settlement. That, we 
know, did not happen. The post-war outcome in Romania could have 
been different only if, during the crucial weeks of 1944-45, General 
Patton’s ‘Hell on Wheels’ had been streaming across the plains of 
Hungary instead of remaining at a standstill at Plzen, waiting for the Red 
Army to liberate Prague, by arrangement. 
, 
3 
British Attitudes Towards the Romanian 
Historic Parties and the Monarchy, 1944-47 
MARK PERCIVAL 
‘Maniu ... is behaving stupidly and should be left to suffer the 
consequences.’ This was the view of Douglas Howard, the Head of the 
Foreign Office Southern Department, when in late November 1944 the 
National Peasant leader talked of withdrawing members of his party 
from the Romanian government led by General Sanatescu on the 
grounds that co-operation with the Communists (who held ministerial 
posts in that government) was impossible.1 Howard felt that Maniu 
should be more willing to work with the Communists and his view was 
backed by Sir Orme Sargent, the Deputy Under Secretary responsible 
for overseeing the Southern Department.2 The statement is an 
illustration of the highly negative view which British officials took of 
the National Peasant and National Liberal parties in the period between 
the coup of 23 August 1944 and the proclamation of the Romanian 
‘Peoples’ Republic’ at the end of 1947. 
British attitudes to the Romanian historic parties should be seen in 
the context of overall policy towards Romania. In the late 1940s, Britain 
continued to show the indifference which it had demonstrated in the 
1930s by its refusal to use economic policy to promote its own political 
influence at the expense of Germany.3 Thus while policy towards 
Romania in the 1930s fitted in with Britain’s conciliatory attitude to 
German expansionism in Eastern Europe, in the 1940s it was linked to a 
similar attitude towards the Soviet Union. (This indifference is perhaps 
surprising in view of the considerable British commercial interests in 
Romania, which suffered both as a result of German and later Soviet 
expansionism.) The Churchill-Stalin Percentages Agreement of October 
1944, which has been emotively described as a sell-out by Romanian 
historians such as Nicolae Baciu, was, in reality simply a manifestation 
1 London, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, FO 371 (hereafter PRO, FO 371), 
43989, R19307; Minute by Howard, 27 November 1944. 
PRO, FO 371, 43989, R19307; Minute by Sargent, 28 November 1944. 
D.B. Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers 1933-40, Durham and London, 
1989, pp. 113-14, 120-23; P.D. Quinlan, Clash over Romania: British and 
American Policies Towards Romania, 1938-47, Los Angeles, 1977 (hereafter 
Clash over Romania), pp. 37-38. 
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of British indifference rather than a definition of policy.* * * 4 There was no 
great conspiracy to carve up the Balkans in October 1944 — Britain 
was simply not interested in Romania and its policy would have differed 
only marginally if the infamous ‘naughty document’ had never existed.5 
There was, therefore, a clear division between the objectives of the 
anti-Communist political forces in Romania on the one hand and the 
British on the other. While the anti-Communist forces wanted to 
prevent at all costs a Soviet/Communist takeover, the British, while not 
being pro-Soviet or pro-Communist, were anxious not to be 
manipulated into a position in which they would be seen to be opposing 
Soviet aims. In fact the division was apparent well before the coup of 
August 1944, and was a constant obstacle to efforts to bring Romania to 
the Allied side during the war. For Romanians like Maniu, who 
supported the Allies, the priority was preserving Romania’s territorial 
integrity (including Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina until Soviet 
military successes made this unrealistic) and its political independence. 
For Britain, safeguarding the Soviet alliance against Germany was 
paramount.6 
After the August 1944 coup, the first issue over which the historic 
parties and the British differed was on participation by Maniu and 
Bratianu in government. Both party leaders preferred to stay out of the 
two Sanatescu administrations which immediately followed the coup, 
and to put less important members of their parties forward, in a move 
which Ghita Ionescu interprets as an attempt by the two to avoid giving 
too much support to a government which might be seen as not having 
full sovereignty and which was unelected.7 However both Ian Le 
Rougetel, the head of the British political mission in Romania, and 
Foreign Office officials in London thought that the two party leaders 
ought to participate in the government, despite Maniu’s complaints that 
it was impossible to work with the Communist ministers. Shortly before 
the fall of the first Sanatescu government on 2 November 1944, a 
Southern Department official minuted that ‘if the machinery of 
government in Roumania breaks down, nobody will be more 
responsible than Mr Maniu with his endless intrigues’, while Le 
N. Baciu, Agonia Romaniei, Cluj, 1990, pp. 116-26. For a more balanced 
account by a Romanian historian of British policy in this period see V. 
Dobrinescu, Anglia si Romania intre anii 1939-1947, Bucharest, 1992. 
By September 1945, the Percentages Agreement had broken down. The Foreign 
Office encouraged publicity over a show trial in Romania because of a Soviet 
press campaign against the Greek government and British policy in Greece. 
(PRO, FO 371, 48558, R15566; minute by Stewart.) This is the last time the 
Agreement is alluded to in open British documents. 
6 K. Hitchins, Romania 1866-1947, Oxford, 1994, pp. 490-500; Quinlan, Clash 
over Romania, pp. 79-103. 
7 G. Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, London, 1964, p. 96. 
MARK PERCIVAL 17 
Rougetel considered that the Soviets would be justified in imposing a 
military government if the uncertainty dragged on.8 
When Maniu contemplated withdrawing members of his party from 
the government in late November 1944 because of the difficulties of 
working with the Communists, London decided that Le Rougetel should 
distance himself from the Peasant leader’s activities. The British 
representative took the view that Maniu still thought in terms of the 
nationality politics of pre-First World War Vienna. ‘He is a nice old 
boy, but a provincial’, he wrote.9 Nevertheless Le Rougetel sympathized 
with the Peasant leader’s complaint that he had been misled by the 
British in the negotiations before the August 1944 coup, and that Britain 
and the United States were doing nothing to prevent Romania’s 
annexation by the Soviet Union. The British representative’s more 
understanding view of Maniu found little sympathy in London.10 
During the period of political uncertainty in early 1945, prior to the 
appointment of the Communist-dominated government of Petru Groza 
on March 6, British policy was influenced by the Churchill-Stalin 
agreement of October 1944. Le Rougetel’s arguments for a more 
positive policy in view of British commercial interests in Romania were 
rejected, and London was reluctant about the U.S. idea of invoking the 
Yalta declaration on liberated Europe with respect to Romania.11 In 
April 1945, a month after Groza took office, Maniu suggested to Le 
Rougetel that the King should be encouraged to dismiss Groza and 
appoint a more representative government. The Peasant leader was 
highly critical of Britain’s indifference to the Romanian situation, which 
he found difficult to understand in view of British commercial interests. 
Le Rougetel thought Maniu’s scheme was foolish, but London went 
further, instructing its political representative to avoid meetings with 
the Peasant leader. The comment was made by a Foreign Office official 
that the Soviet Union would take as strong exception to Britain 
intriguing with Maniu as the British would if a Soviet representative 
was found to be intriguing with the Greek Communists against the 
8 PRO, FO 371, 43988, R18250; Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 9 
November 1944; Minute by Reed, 10 November 1944: PRO, FO 371, 43988, 
R18368; Letter, Le Rougetel to Sargent, 27 October 1944. 
9 PRO, FO 371, 43989, R19307; Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 25 
November 1944; Minute by Sargent, 28 November 1944: PRO, FO 371, 48535, 
R201; Letter, Le Rougetel to Sargent, 10 December 1944. 
10 PRO, FO 371, 43989, R19567; Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 27 
November 1944; Minute by Me. Dermott, 29 November 1944. Le Rougetel 
himself was criticized by officials in London and by Anthony Eden, the Foreign 
Secretary, for being too sympathetic to the Romanians. (See minute by Eden 4 
April 1945, PRO, FO 371, 48539, R6112.) 
11 PRO, FO 371, 48536, R2795; Minute, Le Rougetel to Sargent, 7 February 1945; 
Minute by Howard, 28 February 1945: PRO, FO 371, 48537, R4061; Minute by 
Williams, 1 March 1945. 
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Greek government.12 When the King did go ahead and dismiss the 
government with American encouragement in August 1945, provoking 
a political crisis as Groza refused to resign, the British were highly 
sceptical of the scheme’s likely chances of success. There are indications 
that, as early as September, Britain might have favoured a solution 
along the lines later adopted in the January 1946 Moscow Agreement 
when Britain and the U.S. recognized the Groza government, thus 
ending the political impasse, in return for the inclusion of one member 
of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Bratianu 
Liberals.13 The government also gave guarantees on freedom of the 
press and promised that fair elections would be held. 
In practice the Moscow Agreement amounted to a climbdown by 
Britain and the U.S., since it was violated from the outset and no 
sanctions were taken against the Romanian government or even 
considered. The British had little time for efforts by the National 
Peasants and the Bratianu Liberals to achieve a better settlement. When 
the Soviets insisted that Maniu, Bratianu and Lupu should be excluded 
from a reorganized government, Britain confined itself to stating 
disagreement but complying with Soviet wishes.14 In late December 
1945, the British learned of pressure by the National Peasant and 
Bratianu Liberal parties on the King to reorganize the government on 
much wider lines than those envisaged in the Moscow discussions. The 
plan would have exploited the King’s traditional right to appoint the 
Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs and the Interior. The British gave the 
idea very short shrift. James Marjoribanks, First Secretary at the British 
Legation in Bucharest, told the King’s Private Secretary that the 
Monarch would get no sympathy from Britain or the U.S. for 
government reorganization unless it followed advice from the Allied 
Control Commission.15 
Once the Moscow Agreement had taken effect in January 1946 there 
was little sympathy from the British for the protests of representatives 
of the Peasant and Liberal parties at its repeated violation by the Groza 
government. A Peasant party memorandum, which the British Legation 
received in February, produced no reaction in London, and there was 
no support for an idea hinted at by Romniceanu, the Liberal 
representative in the government, that he should resign because of the 
12 PRO, FO 371,48541, R7337; Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 23 April 
1945; Minute by Stewart, 25 April 1945. 
13 PRO, FO 371, 48607, R16525; Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 27 
September 1945: PRO, FO 371, 48607, R16620; Telegram, Le Rougetel to 
Foreign Office, 27 September 1945. Le Rougetel reported to London that he had 
received information to the effect that Frank Roberts, Counsellor at the British 
Embassy in Moscow, had expressed this view to the Romanian Charge. 
14 PRO, FO 371, 48564, R21548; Telegram, UK Delegation in Moscow to Foreign 
Office, 27 December 1945. 
15 PRO, FO 371, 48564, R21632; Telegram, Marjoribanks to Foreign Office, 27 
December 1945. 
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failure of Groza to allow the Peasant and Liberal representatives to 
participate properly in decision-making. (Such a resignation would have 
provoked a political crisis because of the requirement under the 
Moscow Agreement that the Liberals and Peasants should be included in 
the government.)16 When Maniu, Bratianu, Hafieganu and Romniceanu 
protested in July about the Election Bill and encouraged the King to 
delay signature pending advice from the Western missions (since these 
politicians regarded Britain and the U.S. as being responsible for the 
proper implementation of the Moscow Agreement), Adrian Holman, 
who had succeeded Le Rougetel in April, went so far as to say that the 
leaders of the historic parties were not assets in the effort to preserve 
democracy.17 In September, Maniu resorted to an appeal to Colonel de 
Chastelain, who had been a British S.O.E. officer in wartime Romania, 
for easier access to U.K. officials, who were distancing themselves from 
the Peasant leader and failing to respond to his communications. The 
Foreign Office reluctantly conceded that Maniu should be given the cold 
shoulder less often, but Christopher Warner, the officer responsible for 
Romanian affairs, minuted that Maniu was ‘a tiresome, perhaps at times 
even a silly old man’.18 
The lack of communication between the British and the Romanian 
historic parties was demonstrated by an astonishing failure by Britain to 
understand the parties’ attitude towards elections after the Moscow 
Agreement. Britain pressed for early elections, assuming this was what 
the Peasants and Liberals wanted. However, in June 1946, the Foreign 
Office received a report from a representative of Shell, who had been in 
Romania, which said that the historic parties favoured delaying elections 
until after the Peace Treaty had been signed, by which time they 
assumed Soviet troops would have left the country.19 Holman was asked 
by London to clarify the position and he confirmed what the Shell 
representative had said. But by that stage it was far too late for Britain 
to change its policy. A note had only recently been sent to the Romanian 
government asking it to set a date for the elections. In a marvellous 
understatement one official in London noted that it would have been 
better if the Legation in Bucharest had supplied this information 
16 PRO, FO 371, 59098, R3989; Memorandum by National Peasant Party sent to 
London under cover of letter, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 28 February 1946: 
PRO, FO 371, 59098, R5332, Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 3 April 
1946, Minute by Turner, 8 April 1946. 
17 PRO, FO 371, 59134, R10558, Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 16 July 
1946. 
18 PRO, FO1 371, 59135, R13889; Letter, Maniu to De Chastelain, 18 August 1946; 
Letter, De Chastelain to Sargent, 13 September 1946; Minute by Warner, 27 
September 1946. 
19 PRO, FO 371, 59100, R8747; Report by Otto Stern (Shell), 11 June 1946. 
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earlier.20 In his annual review for 1946, Holman questioned the wisdom 
of the British belief in encouraging early elections. This section was 
removed by officials in London before the final draft was printed.21 
During 1947, the British attitude to the Peasant and Liberal parties 
continued to be cold. In May a former official of the Romanian 
Legation in London, by then in exile in Britain, told the Foreign Office 
that he thought British disinterestedness had encouraged the Romanian 
authorities to carry out arrests, and in the same month, Maniu 
complained to Holman that the British appeared completely to have 
forgotten the historic parties. (The Liberals were equally critical.) The 
Foreign Office was unsympathetic. An official from the Research 
Department considered that it would be better for Maniu and Bratianu 
to disappear from public life and make way for younger leaders. He 
went on to write that ‘the whole of the Romanian politician class are 
under the suspicion of loving their country a little less than themselves 
and they prefer to live abroad on the profits of their former offices’.22 
(In fact Maniu always refused to leave Romania and both he and 
Bratianu died in unpleasant conditions in Communist prisons.) 
In November 1947, Maniu and the National Peasant Party leadership 
were put on trial following the dissolution of the party, and Maniu was 
sentenced to life imprisonment (others to varying terms). One of the 
accusations against Maniu was that he had helped to arrange the failed 
escape attempt of leading Peasant Party members in July. Holman 
considered that Britain could not protest about the dissolution of the 
party or the trial because the leadership had broken the law by trying to 
escape, and there was therefore some justification for the arrests.23 The 
Foreign Office showed more interest in the trial than Holman and 
reminded its representative that it was about the suppression of the 
opposition as with the Petkov trial in Bulgaria.24 However, Holman did 
not accept the Bulgarian parallel and was adamantly opposed to any kind 
of protest. He felt that Britain should avoid becoming involved, because 
it had escaped most of the accusations which had been directed against 
the U.S. mission, and considered that the defendants could be found 
20 PRO, FO 371, 59100, R8747; Telegram, Foreign Office to Holman, 28 June 
1946: PRO, FO 371, 59100, R9816; Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 1 July 
1946; Minute by Warner, 4 July 1946. 
21 PRO, FO 371, 67233, R4150; Holman’s Annual Report on Romania for 1946, 
dated 27 March 1947. File contains the version written by Holman, handwritten 
alterations made by officials in London, and the final printed report. 
22 PRO, FO 371, 67235, R6657; Minute by Colville, 8 May 1947: PRO, FO 371, 
67235, R6873; Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 20 May 1947: PRO, FO 
371, 67235, R7209; Minute by Chalmer Bell, 6 May 1947. 
PRO, FO 371, 67239, R10376; Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 28 July 
1947: PRO, FO 371, 67242, R14291; Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 25 
October 1947. 
24 PRO, FO 371, 67243, R14622, Telegram, Foreign Office to Bucharest, 1 
November 1947; Personal telegram, Sargent to Holman, 6 November 1947. 
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guilty in an English court. On 12 November in a telegram he reported 
the sentencing: ‘Every defendant was, I think justifiably, found guilty 
legally on one or more of the charges.’25 In a despatch written the same 
day, Holman wrote that facts had been revealed about the National 
Peasant Party at the trial ‘which definitely establish it as a “fascist” 
organisation by East European standards’.26 
The British had a more positive view of King Michael than of the 
historic parties. There was none of the vehement personal criticism that 
was made of Maniu and Bratianu. In fact one official described the King 
as ‘the only sensible and resolute man in Roumania’.27 As far as the 
British attitude to his political role went, there was some change 
between 1944 and 1946. Immediately after the August 1944 coup, the 
B.B.C. was told to ‘continue to give indirect support to King Michael 
and his government... but do not build up King Michael as the national 
hero or imply that the present government is permanent’.28 During the 
political uncertainty prior to the appointment of the Groza government 
in March 1945, the Foreign Office was reluctant to give the Monarch 
advice.29 In June 1945, Le Rougetel expressed concern that the 
Communists might try to bring ex-King Carol back to Romania to 
replace Michael and thereby discredit the Monarchy. The Head of the 
Foreign Office Southern Department was sceptical as to whether this 
would really happen and thought that even if it did, the replacement of 
Michael by Carol ‘would not make matters one jot worse from our 
point of view’.30 
After the Moscow Agreement, the King appeared to take on a more 
important role for British policy makers. Ostensibly, London’s strategy 
was to persuade him to make concessions to the government in order to 
25 PRO, FO 371, 67243, R14554, Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 31 October 
1947: PRO, FO 371, 67243, R14612, Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 1 
November 1947: PRO, FO 371, 67243, R14613, Telegram, Holman to Foreign 
Office, 1 November 1947: PRO, FO 371, 67244, R14894, Telegram, Holman to 
Foreign Office, 7 November 1947: PRO, FO 371, 67244, R15107: Telegram, 
Holman to Foreign Office, 12 November 1947. 
26 PRO, FO 371, 67245, R15335; Despatch, Holman to Foreign Office, 12 
November 1947. It is notable how little sympathy was shown by the British to 
those who hoped to escape from Communist-dominated Romania. In a telegram 
dated 5 June 1946 (PRO, FO 371, 59100, R8474), Holman reported that he had 
refused to guarantee to Vi§oianu and Radescu, who were proposing to escape, 
that they would not be sent back to Romania if they reached British-controlled 
territory. This fitted in with the policy towards ‘Soviet citizens’ who came into the 
hands of the British at the end of the war. See Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret: 
Forcible Repatriation to Russia, 1944-7, London, 1974. 
27 PRO, FO 371, 43989, R19568; Minute by Clutton, 30 November 1944. 
28 PRO, FO 371, 43986, R14652; Political Warfare Executive weekly directive to 
the BBC Romanian Service, 15-22 September 1944. 
29 PRO, FO 371, 48537, R4245; Minute by Howard, 27 February 1945. 
30 PRO, FO 371, 48571, R10896; Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 25 
June 1945; Minute by Hay ter, 28 June 1945. 
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stay in office, so that later he would be able to dismiss a Communist- 
dominated government and return the country to democracy. Le 
Rougetel was told by London to encourage him to persuade the 
opposition parties to accept the Moscow Agreement, and in July 1946 
the King was the key element in the idea advanced by Holman of a two- 
stage return to normality. First, fraudulent elections would take place 
(which Holman seemed to think of as progress because they would at 
least give the opposition some representation in Parliament) and then, at 
a later stage, the Monarch would dissolve Parliament and move to fresh 
elections.31 Britain showed no sympathy for the view expressed by 
Maniu in July 1946 that the Monarch should refuse to sign the electoral 
law, despite the Peasant leader’s largely accurate prediction that 
signature would be paving the way for the disappearance of the 
Monarchy within a year. (In fact it lasted another eighteen months.)32 
After the fraudulent elections of November 1946, the King’s Private 
Secretary told Holman that he thought the King should refuse to open 
Parliament. However, to do this he would need backing from Britain 
and the U.S. in the form of a statement that the undertaking made in the 
Moscow Agreement to hold free elections had not been fulfilled. 
London was unwilling to make such a statement, and when the King did 
go ahead and open Parliament at the beginning of December he made it 
clear to Holman that he had done so because of the absence of backing 
from Britain and the U.S. In his annual review for 1946, Holman 
criticized the Foreign Office’s failure to make a statement. It was, he 
wrote, ‘no easy task for the British and American representatives ... to 
explain ... the reasons which had prompted His Majesty’s Government, 
with little or no warning, to modify their policy at this critical 
juncture’. London had no time for Holman’s criticisms and, as with the 
passage which dealt with British policy over the elections, this section 
was removed from the final version of the annual review, printed in 
London. One Foreign Office official referred to Holman’s ‘local bias’. 
For his part, Holman asked to be recalled.33 
In November 1947, King Michael came to London to attend the 
wedding of Princess Elizabeth in spite of British reluctance that he 
should leave Romania. He returned on 21 December, nine days before 
31 PRO, FO 371, 48564, R21632; Telegram, Foreign Office to Le Rougetel, 1 
January 1946: PRO, FO 371, 59100, R9816, Telegram, Holman to Foreign 
Office, 1 July 1946. 
PRO, FO 371, 59101, R10405; Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 12 July 
1946. 
PRO, FO 371, 59106, R16999; Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 23 
November 1946: PRO, FO 371, 59106, R17046, Telegram, Foreign Office to 
Bucharest, 26 November 1946: PRO, FO 371, 59107, R17683; Telegram, 
Holman to Foreign Office, 5 December 1946: PRO, FO 371, 67233, R4150; 
Holman’s Annual Report on Romania for 1946, dated 27 March 1947. (See note 
21 above.) PRO, FO 371, 59136, R17522, Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 
29 November 1946. 
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he was forced to abdicate. The abdication appears to have taken the 
British completely by surprise. It was simply reported in a telegram on 
30 December, and the King seems to have been given no advice by the 
British Legation as to what he should do in the event of being asked to 
abdicate. There was virtually no commentary on the abdication either 
by the British Legation or by the Foreign Office in London. There 
appears to have been no communication between the King and the 
British Legation between his return to Romania on 21 December and his 
abdication on 30 December.34 
The King had supposedly been the linchpin of British policy. The 
idea had been that he should make concessions to the Communists in 
order to retain his position. The lack of advice on what he should do in 
the event of being told to abdicate and the lack of attention by the 
Foreign Office and the British Legation to the abdication question is a 
clear indication of the indifference with which British officials regarded 
Romania. 
The distaste shown by British officials towards the Romanian historic 
parties and the indifference shown to the position of King Michael are 
the result of Britain’s very different attitude to Romania’s future 
compared with that of the anti-Communist political forces within the 
country. While it is a mistake to suggest, as Baciu does, that Britain 
actively promoted the Communist takeover, she nevertheless did not 
regard the preservation of democracy in Romania as a foreign policy 
priority. At least until the end of the war in Europe, this was not 
unreasonable. Baciu ignores the fact that in October 1944, when the 
Percentages Agreement was made, the war was by no means over. 
London was still being bombed (and continued to be well into 1945) and 
the British armed forces faced a difficult campaign before the final 
defeat of Germany.35 In these circumstances, it was essential to ensure 
that the Soviet Union played its full part in the war, and was not 
antagonized. After the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, the 
conciliatory attitude shown by Britain towards Soviet designs in 
Romania is more difficult to justify. While Romanian politicians were 
often unrealistic in their expectations of British intervention, Britain 
would not have suffered at this stage (and might have gained, in view of 
its commercial interests) had it taken a more robust diplomatic stance 
against the fraudulently imposed Groza government and in favour of the 
political forces which had genuine support in Romania. For example, 
after the fraudulent elections of November 1946, Britain could have 
announced that it considered that the Moscow Agreement had not been 
fulfilled and hence could not regard the Groza government as 
legitimate, thus making the signing of a peace treaty impossible. 
34 PRO, FO 371, 67248, R17019; Telegram, Sarrell to Foreign Office, 30 
December 1947. 
35 Baciu, Agonia Romaniei, pp. 116-26. 
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Furthermore, while it is true that Maniu at times showed a lack of 
political judgement (he was, after all, an old and sick man), the 
criticisms made by officials in London were often surprisingly 
irrational. Rather than attempting objectively to analyse why Maniu was 
behaving in the way he did, they preferred to make emotional, ill- 
thought-out and often unsubstantiated assessments. A more objective 
analysis would have led British officials to accept the realities of the 
situation, rather than to expect Romanian politicians to fit in with what 
Britain wanted. The clear divergence between the aims of the British on 
the one hand and the anti-Communist political forces in Romania on the 
other made it inevitable that their approaches would conflict. 
4 
What was the Role of the Romanian Communist Party 
in the Coup of 23 August 1944? 
DENNIS DELETANT 
It is one of the many ironies in the history of the Romanians that the 
principal architects of the coup of 23 August 1944, King Michael and 
the democratic leaders, overthrew a military dictatorship only to be 
virtually overthrown themselves within six months by another incipient 
totalitarian order. In East Germany and Poland, where the ravages of 
war had removed all political structures, it was relatively simple for 
Stalin to bring his client Communist parties to power, but in Romania 
the imposition of the new order required the removal of surviving 
structures. King Michael’s coup had pre-empted any Soviet move to 
seize immediate power and when Soviet troops entered Bucharest eight 
days later they found a Romanian government without significant 
Communist representation ready to negotiate an armistice and hold 
elections. 
Besides the crucial impact which it had upon the course charted by 
Stalin for the Romanian Communist Party, the coup was also 
responsible for bringing Dej into the forefront of the political events, 
thereby launching him on the road to power. Since Dej emerged first as 
the leader of that wing of the Party which was most closely involved 
with the coup, and then went on to secure his domination of the entire 
Party, the coup was accorded a sacred place in Party history. Even 
before Dej achieved supremacy within the Party, his Communist 
colleagues sought to deny the credit gained by the King and the major 
democratic parties for the coup by assuming it exclusively for 
themselves, thereby claiming legitimacy for their ascension to 
government. To this end, the role of the Romanian Communists in the 
coup was deliberately exaggerated by the Party to justify its right to 
rule the country. King Michael was relegated to the position of a mere 
spectator. In this endeavour, Communist apologists were abetted by the 
supression by the Communist authorities of any accounts of the coup 
which did not fit into their scenario of the events.1 Therefore the 
These included A.G. Lee, Crown against Sickle, London, 1950; R.H. Markham, 
Rumania under the Soviet Yoke, Boston, 1949; R. Bishop and E.S. Crayfield, 
Russia Astride the Balkans, London, 1949. The historiography of the coup is 
presented in R.R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, Stanford, 
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accounts of key participants in the events, that is, of the King and of 
members of his entourage who escaped to the West, describing the 
King’s crucial act in ordering the arrest of Marshal Antonescu on 23 
August 1944 were largely unknown in Romania before the overthrow 
of the Communist regime. 
An example of this distortion was Lucrefiu Patra§canu’s account of 
the preparations for the coup, published on its first anniversary in 
Romania libera . Patra§canu claimed that ‘three meetings were held at 
the palace with King Michael in the chair to prepare for the coup of 23 
August’ at which he (Patra§canu) was ‘the only representative of the 
entire opposition’.2 This is incorrect. Preparations for the coup were 
discussed simultaneously at the palace, where the king consulted with his 
personal advisers, and by the so-called National Democratic Bloc, 
formed on 20 June 1944 from representatives of the National Peasant, 
National Liberal, Social Democratic, and Communist parties, who met 
at various houses. On 13 June Patra§canu and Bodnara§ met a group of 
the King’s advisers but the main purpose is said to have been to discuss 
future relations with Moscow.3 While it is true that even before the 
formation of the NDB, Patra§canu and Titel Petrescu, the leader of the 
Social Democrats, were taking part in the secret preparations for the 
coup under the King’s chairmanship, all the subsequent coup plans were 
discussed at meetings of the NDB, and the last meeting held before the 
coup, on 21 August, was attended by the King, his palace advisers, the 
leaders of the major opposition parties, and Patra§canu.4 Today, with 
the recent publication of eye-witness accounts of the coup and the 
1980, pp. 40-43, and in M. Shafir, Romania. Politics, Economics and Society, 
London, 1985, pp. 30-37. 
L. Patra§canu, ‘Cum s-a pregatit actul de la 23 august 1944’, Romania libera, p. 
9. 
In a conversation in December 1944 with V. Morev, the TASS correspondent in 
Romania, Patra§canu claimed that ‘the first meeting in connection with the 
preparations for the coup took place with the King in May 1944. At the meeting, 
apart from the King, were generals Sanatescu, Mihail, Ra§canu, and Aldea, 
Niculescu-Buze§ti, Styrcea, Patra^canu and Bodnara§. The last two were the only 
representatives of a political party.’ (Foreign Policy Archive, Moscow, fond 
0125, opis 33, file 6, folio 127, pp. 128-34.) I am grateful to Dr Florin 
Constantiniu for drawing my attention to this document. Morev’s account 
contradicts the dairy of loan Hudija, a junior official in the National Peasant Party 
at the time of the coup. In it Niculescu-Buze§ti is reported to have met Patra^canu 
and Bodnara§ for the first time on 13 June (loan Hudfta, ‘Pagini de Jumal’, 
Magazin Istoric, vol. 28, July 1994, no. 7, p. 41. 
The most lucid account of the coup and preparations for it is given by Ivor Porter, 
Operation Autonomous. With S.O.E. in Wartime Romania, London, 1989 
(hereafter Operation Autonomous). ‘Autonomous’ was the code-name for a three- 
man Special Operations Executive mission, parachuted into Romania on 22 
December 1943. The team, consisting of Lt. Col. A.G.G. de Chastelain, Cpt. 
Ivor Porter and a Romanian radio operator Silviu Mejianu, was arrested almost 
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disclosure by contemporaries of Patra§canu and Dej of fresh 
information about the activities of the Romanian Communist Party 
during the war and its relationship to Moscow, the part played by the 
Communists in the coup can be determined with greater accuracy, and 
in the process the mystification of the coup perpetrated at Dej’s behest 
can be dispelled. 
Following the crushing defeat at Stalingrad, King Michael called for 
peace in his 1943 New Year broadcast to his people. Irritated by what 
he considered to be the indecisiveness of the opposition, led by Maniu 
and Bratianu, the young King declared later that he had been ready to 
take Romania out of the war against the Allies in February 1944 but that 
‘whenever plans appeared to be maturing he was prevented from taking 
action by objections raised by the opposition’.5 The King’s impatience 
was doubtless a sign of his youth (he was only twenty-two), and the 
elderly Maniu advised more prudently against a coup at that time on the 
grounds that there were too many German troops in the country. 
Nevertheless, the King could turn to the wise counsels of his mother, 
Queen Helen, of General Sanatescu, the head of the military household, 
and of Grigore Niculescu-Buze§ti, the head of the cypher and 
communication section of the Foreign Ministry. 
It was Maniu who was in regular radio contact with the British via a 
radio operator called Nicolae "fmcam1 (code-named ‘Reginald’) who 
had been sent into Romania in June 1943 by SOE. At the end of October 
1943, Maniu had expressed a desire to leave Romania in order to 
contact the Russians with British assistance. In response the Foreign 
Office told Maniu that any approaches from Romania, be they from 
individuals or from the government, should be addressed to all three 
Allies and that they should take the form of an offer by a duly 
authorized emissary to sign an unconditional surrender to the three 
principal Allies. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office told the Soviet 
government about Maniu’s request. In Stockholm the Romanian 
Counsellor George Duca contacted the British and American Ministers 
in December 1943 in the name of Maniu about peace terms, unaware 
that his own Minister, Frederick Nanu, had been instructed by Marshal 
Antonescu and Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu to put out his own 
peace feelers. Indeed, on 26 December, Nanu was approached by what 
he took to be an NKVD officer with an offer to deal with the Romanian 
government and contact was maintained for several months on a 
clandestine basis. Nanu was told that the Russians would keep the 
Western Allies informed and that strict secrecy should be maintained. 
On 13 April armistice terms agreed by the representatives of the 
American, British and Soviet governments in Cairo were transmitted to 
the Marshal and to Maniu. They called for a Romanian volte face 
5 
‘Report of Lt. Col. A.G.G. de Chastelain on the “Autonomous” Mission, dated 
September 1944’ in 23 August 1944. Documente, II, Bucharest, 1984, p. 802. 
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against the Germans, the payment of reparations to the Russians, the 
confirmation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina as Soviet territory, 
the restoration of Northern Transylvania to Romania, and the granting 
to Soviet troops of unrestricted movement, although not occupation, 
throughout Romania during the period of the armistice.6 
The receipt of the terms seems to have caused a breach to open up 
between the Marshal and Maniu. In a letter written by Maniu in mid- 
April, the Peasant Party leader stated that Antonescu ‘wished to continue 
the war at the side of the Germans’, while Maniu accepted the terms and 
said that, once he was certain that Antonescu could not be moved, he 
would act in conjunction with the King.7 Even so, the suspicion that the 
Western Allies, and in particular Britain, had abandoned Romania to the 
Russians, troubled Maniu, who used the Romanian emissary to Cairo, 
Constantin Vi§oianu, to voice these concerns to Christopher Steel, the 
British representative, at the end of May. This provoked Antony Eden, 
the Foreign Secretary, to instruct Steel to tell Vi^oianu that there was no 
use in his trying to obtain assurances about British policy ‘as distinct 
from that of the Soviet government’. But there was no rebuke from 
Eden when Steel, in answer to a further question from Vi^oianu as to 
whether Maniu should form ‘a democratic coalition embracing the 
Romanian Communist Party’, replied that in his own view a broad 
national union of this kind would be ‘warmly welcomed by Allied 
public opinion’.8 
This cautious advice probably confirmed Maniu in his view that it 
would be good politics to bring the Communists into a coalition and 
when Vi§oianu, who arrived in Cairo on 25 May, asked Daniel 
Semionovici Selod, the assistant to Nikolai Novikov, the Soviet 
representative in Cairo, to suggest a name, Selod replied ‘Lucrefiu 
Patra§canu’.9 Although held under house arrest throughout 1943 and 
6 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, vol. IV, Washington DC, p. 170. 
Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, 
London, 1976 (hereafter British Policy in South-East Europe), p. 233. 
8 Ibid., pp. 237-38. 
Interview with Comeliu Coposu, 31 October 1991. In a paper presented at a 
symposium in Paris on 22 May 1994, Coposu disclosed, in his capacity as 
Maniu’s secretary and the person responsible for enciphering and deciphering 
Maniu’s telegrams in the British code sent via Turcanu to Cairo, that in response 
to Novikov’s suggestion to Vi$oianu that the Romanian opposition should involve 
the section of the Comintern in Romania, Novikov was told that the number of 
Communists in Romania identified by the SSI (Romanian Intelligence) was 720, 
of whom 845 were foreigners. In reply, Maniu was told that it was common 
knowledge that a section of the Comintern in Romania did not exist but that public 
opinion abroad had to have the impression of the existence of a homogeneous 
opposition embracing all social and political categories. Maniu said that, in that 
case, he had nothing against the enlargement of the opposition. However, of the 
Communists contacted in Romania claimed to be the true representatives of the 
Romanian Communist Party. With some satisfaction, Maniu cabled Novikov for 
his direction as to who was official representative of the Comintern in Romania 
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early 1944 at a mountain village called Poiana Japului near Sinaia, the 
King’s summer residence, Patra§canu was kept informed of plans to take 
Romania out of the war by Colonel Octav Ulea, Master of Ceremonies 
at the Palace, and in April 1944 he negotiated an agreement with Titel 
Petrescu, the leader of the Social Democrats, to set up a United 
Workers’ Front, thus giving the Communist Party greater authority. 
Both took part in the secret preparations for the coup under the King’s 
chairmanship. Patra§canu was brought into meetings of a sub-committee 
under Colonel Dumitru Damaceanu which prepared plans for the 
defence of Bucharest, and at the beginning of June he suggested that the 
Communist Party’s military representative, Emil Bodnara§ (code-named 
engineer Ceau§u), should attend since he could organize small bands of 
armed workers who could assist in a volte face. 
Bodnara§ made his first appearance at one of these meetings at a 
house on Calea Mo§ilor on the night of 13 June. Unlike his colleagues 
Dej, Apostol, Chi§inevski and Georgescu, he had been exempted from 
internment at the Tirgu-Jiu prison camp after being released from 
Caransebe§ prison in December 1942 on the grounds of having been an 
officer in the Romanian army. His role in the preparations for the coup 
remains shadowy and has consequently fomented speculation, including 
the suggestion that he was used by Marshal Antonescu as a clandestine 
conduit to the Soviet authorities. After the Axis defeat at Stalingrad, it 
was clear to Antonescu that it would be prudent to establish closer links 
with the Russians and Bodnara§ was an obvious channel. Even members 
of the King’s circle were impressed by Bodnara^’s dedication10 and the 
latter, in his turn, was sufficiently convinced by the thoroughness of the 
plans to be able to satisfy his Communist colleagues that the Romanian 
Communist Party stood to enhance its position by joining the National 
Peasant, National Liberal, and Social Democratic parties in the 
formation of the National Democratic Bloc on 20 June 1944. 
A week later, the Allied representatives in Cairo received the plan 
drawn up by the King and the NDB for the coup. To be successful, 
Maniu argued, the coup had to be accompanied by three Allied actions. 
First, there should be a major Soviet offensive on the Romanian front 
within twenty-four hours of the volte face; second, three airborne 
brigades, either Anglo-American or Soviet, with an additional 2,000 
parachute troops should be dropped at the time of the coup; third, there 
should be a heavy bombardment of communications with Hungary and 
Bulgaria. The plan met a favourable response from both the British and 
American representatives, yet when the American suggested a tripartite 
meeting to discuss it, the Soviet representative Nikolai Novikov said that 
this would be premature. 
and Novikov replied: ‘Lucrepu Patra§canu’ (‘Exilul Romanesc: Identitate §i 
Con^tiinpa istorica,’ Lupta, 1 octombrie 1994, no. 232, p. 5). 
1 0 Porter, Operation Autonomous, p. 175. 
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Novikov waited in vain for instructions from Moscow. The Russians 
had nothing to lose by pinning their hopes on a bilateral deal with 
Marshal Antonescu; this had the double advantage for them of dealing 
directly with Romania’s military leader, thereby obviating the need to 
negotiate with Maniu, a figure who was likely to cause embarassment to 
them in the future, and of giving them time, in view of the Marshal’s 
hesitancy, to prepare for their military occupation of Romania. Indeed, 
at the beginning of June, Madame Alexandra Kollontay, the Soviet 
minister in Stockholm, had offered improved armistice conditions to 
Nanu which, in addition to an unconditional promise to return 
Transylvania, pledged to allow ‘free areas’ where the Romanian 
government would be sovereign, and where no foreign troops would be 
allowed to enter, to show leniency over reparations, and to allow 15 
days between the signing of an armistice and a Romanian declaration of 
war on Germany.11 
Soviet hopes of Antonescu were dashed when the Marshal saw Hitler 
on 5 August. To Hitler’s leading question as to whether Romania 
intended to fight on, Antonescu temporized by saying that this depended 
upon Germany’s commitment to assist Romania stem the Russian 
advance, and upon the attitude of Hungary and Bulgaria. The Marshal 
returned to Bucharest in deep depression and did nothing about the 
Soviet terms. In the meantime, Maniu was desperately seeking a reply 
from Cairo to the coup plan sent on 27 June. On 7 July, the King and 
his advisors, including the opposition leaders, fixed 15 August as the 
date for action, hoping to synchronize their action with a Soviet 
offensive. The longer the coup was delayed, the greater the chance that 
the Red Army would push forward, occupying more Romanian 
territory and giving Moscow a reason for preferring a straightforward 
military conquest of the country without any help from the King and the 
opposition. Moreover, the increasingly frequent Anglo-American air 
raids on the oilfields around Ploie^ti and on Bucharest were a reminder 
to the Romanians of the cost of the alliance with Germany. Still Maniu 
heard nothing from Cairo, and the coup was postponed. Finally, on 20 
August the long-awaited Soviet offensive came, prompting Maniu to 
inform Cairo that the King and his group had decided to take action. 
The Soviet generals Malinovsky and Tolbukhin successfully launched 
a massive assault of almost one million troops and 1,500 tanks against 
the combined German and Romanian forces straddling the Prut. The 
front south of Ia§i was breached and the King rushed from Sinaia to 
Bucharest to consult with his advisors. The representatives of the 
political parties could not be located. The King asked Colonel 
Damaceanu how long he needed to get his part of the plan, namely to 
seize the telephone exhange and the radio station, ready, and was told 
‘five days’. The coup was therefore fixed for 26 August at 1 pm. The 
1 1 Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, p. 239. 
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Marshal and Mihai Antonescu would be invited to lunch, after which 
there would be an audience to discuss the course to be adopted. If the 
Marshal refused negotiation with the Allies, the King would dismiss him 
and appoint a new government to be drawn from the opposition parties. 
This government would invite the Germans to evacuate Romania and 
empower its emissaries in Cairo, Barbu §tirbey and Constantin 
Vi§oianu, to sign an armistice. 
On the following evening, 21 August, the plans agreed by the King 
and his advisors the day before were approved by the members of the 
NDB at their last full meeting before the coup. It was attended by the 
King, Maniu, Bratianu, Patra§canu, Titel Petrescu, Grigore Niculescu- 
Buze§ti, the head of Foreign Ministry communications, Ion Mocsony- 
Styrcea, the Marshal of the King’s Household, General Constantin 
Sanatescu, and Mircea Ionnijiu, the King’s private secretary.12 
Patra§canu came with a draft proclamation for the King’s approval and 
argued, with Petrescu’s backing, for a government of national unity led 
by Maniu. Maniu refused and pressed for a government of technicians, 
headed by a soldier, to handle the armistice conditions and the presence 
of the Red Army. The matter was left in the hands of Maniu and 
Patra§canu who were to draw up a list of ministers by 23 August. It was 
agreed that the politicians should disperse until the projected day of 
action, 26 August. 
Yet once again, unforseen circumstances intervened in the timing of 
the coup. Antonescu, dismayed by the rapid advance of the Soviet 
forces, was moving back and forth between the front in southern 
Moldavia and Bucharest and decided to return to the front on 24 
August. This meant that he would probably be absent from the capital 
on the day fixed for the coup. The news, which had been picked up 
fortuitously by Styrcea, was quickly transmitted to the King who was 
able to get word to Maniu that the coup should be brought forward to 
23 August. Mihai Antonescu, the Prime Minister, was unnerved by the 
deteriorating military situation and decided, on his own initiative, to 
negotiate an armistice with the Allies. He nevertheless told the Marshal 
on the evening of 22 August and the latter raised no objections. That 
same evening the Marshal told the German minister Clodius that he 
would make one last effort to halt the Russians, and that in the event of 
failure he reserved the right to act as he saw fit. After the meeting with 
Clodius Mihai Antonescu sent a courier to Stockholm instructing Nanu 
to tell Madame Kollontay of the Romanian government’s willingness to 
resume (my italics) negotiations on an armistice, and not, as has been 
claimed, to conclude one. In the event the courier arrived on 24 August, 
the day after the coup.13 
12 Porter, Operation Autonomous, pp. 192-93. 
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On the morning of 23 August, in a last-ditch effort to get the 
Marshal to conclude an armistice, Maniu and Constantin Bratianu asked 
the historian Gheorghe Bratianu, the Liberal leader’s nephew, to use the 
respect he enjoyed with the Romanian leader to persuade him to see the 
King that afternoon. The Marshal listened to Bratianu’s arguments and 
apparently agreed to go to the Palace, but on condition that Maniu and 
Gheorghe Bratianu sent him a letter by 3 pm confirming that they stood 
behind him in signing an armistice. The Marshal then gave instructions 
that an audience should be sought with the King at 4 pm. Mihai 
Antonescu was granted a separate one at 3.30. 
The King now convened his advisors and decided that the show-down 
with the Marshal should take place at his audience that afternoon. 
Niculescu-Buze§ti and Styrcea left the palace to warn Maniu and 
Patra§canu respectively but Maniu was not at home and Patra§canu’s 
contact said that Patra§canu and Titel Petrescu would come to the 
palace, but only after nightfall. Similarly, George Bratianu could find 
neither his uncle nor Maniu and was therefore unable to meet the 
Marshal’s condition that he should bring a letter from both by 3 pm. 
When George Bratianu turned up to see the Marshal empty-handed the 
latter was furious and said that Mihai Antonescu could go to the palace 
alone and pass on the Marshal’s apologies to the King.14 
Mihai Antonescu arrived for his audience at the appointed time and 
was received by the King and General Sanatescu. He offered Marshal 
Antonescu’s apologies, at which point Sanatescu left the room and 
telephoned the Marshal, saying that there was no point in snubbing the 
King at this critical time. The Marshal relented and agreed to come. He 
was escorted into the drawing room to meet the King who was with 
Mihai Antonescu and Sanatescu. The Marshal proceeded to give a 
detailed account of the situation at the front and said that he would only 
made it quite clear to his audience at the fiftieth anniversary symposium on ‘23 
August 1944 in the history of Romania’, held in Bucharest on 8-9 October 1994 
(to which King Michael had accepted an invitation but was refused entry to 
Romania by the authorities), that Mihai Antonescu, with the Marshal’s approval, 
had merely told Nanu to approach Madame Kollontai to ask whether the earlier 
conditions given by the Russians were still valid or would have to be negotiated. 
At the same time, Djuvara revealed, Mihai Antonescu instructed Nanu not to tell 
the British and Americans of this approach to the Soviets. Mihai Antonescu did 
not, as Nanu later claimed, tell him that the Marshal was ready to withdraw and 
had given Mihai a free hand to sign the armistice (F.C. Nano, ‘The First Soviet 
Double-Cross: A Chapter in the Secret History of World War II’, Journal of 
Central European Affairs, vol. 12, Oct. 1952, no. 3, pp. 236-58). As Djuvara 
remarked, the events in the three-month period since the issue of the Russian 
conditions had rendered many of them irrelevant and the mere raising of the 
question as to whether they were still valid showed how out of touch with reality 
the two Antonescus were. 
1 4 This account of events on 23 August is taken from M. Ionnftiu, ‘23 August 1944. 
Amintiri §i reflecjiuni’ (hereafter ‘23 August 1994’), Revista istorica, vol. 2, 
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conclude an armistice after obtaining Hitler’s consent. The King replied 
that the military situation would brook no further delay; since Soviet 
troops were already in occupation of part of the country an armistice 
should be signed immediately. Asked by the King whether he would 
stand aside for someone who would contact the Allies the Marshal 
replied, ‘Never’. After withdrawing briefly to his study to inform his 
advisors, Styrcea, Buze§ti, Ionnifiu and General Aurel Aldea, that the 
moment had now come for the Marshal’s arrest, the King returned to 
the drawing room and told the Marshal that, in concordance with the 
wishes of the Romanian people as expressed through the four 
democratic parties, he was taking the country out of the war to save it 
from disaster. If the Marshal refused to implement the King’s wish that 
an armistice be concluded, then he should consider himself dismissed. 
When the Marshal said he took orders from no one the King retorted 
that, in that case, he was dismissed and he left the room. As he did so he 
signalled to his aide, Colonel Emilian Ionescu, to arrest the Marshal and 
Mihai Antonescu. Ionescu summoned the four-man guard that had been 
prepared for such an eventuality and amid the protests of the Marshal 
the two Antonescus were escorted upstairs and locked in the King’s 
large safe. 
Back in his study the King consulted with his advisors as to the 
immediate steps to be taken. The leaders of the political parties had to 
be informed of the arrests, the Allies had to be notified, the military 
plan for the coup had to be executed, but most important of all, a Prime 
Minister had to be named to replace Mihai Antonescu. In the absence of 
Maniu, it was decided to appoint General Sanatescu, who enjoyed the 
respect of the army. Ionnifiu typed out a decree to this effect, the King 
signed it, and the new Prime Minster set out for army headquarters to 
transmit the order for Romanian troops under Colonel Damaceanu to 
take up positions at strategic points in Bucharest and to cease hostilities 
against the Soviet forces at the front. Proof that the army placed their 
loyalty to their supreme commander, the King, above that to Marshal 
Antonescu, was the fact that not a single senior officer disobeyed 
Sanatescu’s orders and not one of them defected to the Marshal. 
Since Maniu and Patra§canu had failed to agree on a list of ministers, 
and neither was at the palace, the new government had to be formed on 
the spot from the King’s advisors. Niculescu-Buze§ti, a counsellor in the 
Foreign Ministry, was elevated to Foreign Minister, and General Aldea 
became Minister of the Interior, while the representatives of the four 
parties in the NDB — Maniu, Bratianu, Petrescu and Patra§canu — 
were appointed Ministers of State without Portfolio. Ionnifiu was 
doubtless not alone in his feeling at the time that the politicians had, at 
this crucial moment, shown themselves to be ‘a pathetic bunch’.15 
1 5 Ionnipu, ‘23 August 1994’, p. 570. 
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The first of them to appear at the palace was Patra§canu, who 
arrived shortly after 8 pm. He brought with him the King’s 
proclamation, which was approved after amendments by Buze§ti and 
Sanatescu, and the texts of two decrees, previously agreed at meetings of 
the NDB, granting an amnesty to political prisoners and abolishing the 
internment camps in which many Communists and other political 
detainees had been held. At the same time, Patra§canu asked the King 
for the post of Minister of Justice. Since none of the other political 
leaders had cabinet seats, the King did not want to risk an accusation of 
partiality, but given Patra§canu’s legal background, his diligence in 
producing the draft proclamation and the decrees, and that he was the 
first member of the NDB to appear at the palace, the King offered him 
a compromise, Minister of Justice ad-interim. The fact that Patra§canu, 
alone among the political representatives, secured this temporary 
position gave rise in accounts about the formation of this new 
government to the supposition that he was acting on orders from the 
Communist Party and this, in turn, helped to cement the fiction in 
Communist historiography of the dominant role of the Party in the 
coup. On the other hand, it could be argued that Patra§canu, given the 
speed of events on the afternoon of 23 August, did not have time to 
contact the leaders of the Communist Party and in the face of a fait 
accompli decided to satisfy a personal vanity.16 
Patra§canu’s arrival at the palace was followed shortly afterwards by 
that of Titel Petrescu and then, an hour or so later, by that of Emil 
Bodnara§ who was presented to the King under the name of ‘engineer 
Ceau§u’ and head of a group of Communist-trained armed civilians 
known as the ‘Patriotic Guards’. About an hour after the recording of 
the King’s proclamation to the country announcing the coup and the 
immediate cessation of hostilities with the Allies was broadcast over the 
radio at 10.12 pm, Marshal Antonescu, who was still locked in the 
palace strong room, asked for paper and made his will. Another hour 
passed before Bodnara§ and a group of armed workers took charge of 
the two Antonescus and drove them away to a safe house in the 
Bucharest district of Vatra Luminoasa.17 
Even today, political opponents of the King have joined admirers of 
Antonescu in seeking to make capital at the expense of the King over 
this transfer of the Marshal to the Communists, accusing the monarch of 
‘treachery’. The truth of the matter is that the first consideration for the 
King and the NDB had been, in planning the coup, to prevent the 
Marshal from reaching the German forces and thereby setting up a 
‘rebel’ pro-German government. In this respect they were faced with a 
1 6 This is the view of Ionnipu. 
1 7 L. Patra§canu, op. cit. Among this group of armed civilians was said to be §tefan 
Mladin who for a period after 23 August was one of those responsible for the 
bodyguard of Gheorghiu-Dej. 
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problem: they did not want to hand Antonescu over to the police, whom 
the Marshal had used to harass the opposition leaders, for fear that they 
might release him. Patra§canu proposed instead that a civilian guard, 
drawn from trusted persons from all four opposition parties, should 
take custody of Antonescu until the police was purged. He was ready to 
offer volunteers from within the Communist Party and invited the other 
parties to do the same. This idea found favour with Maniu and Bratianu. 
At a subsequent meeting at the palace on 17 August, Maniu announced 
that he had a team of National Peasant Party volunteers ready to 
undertake this role. However, on the evening of the coup this team was 
not available, having been sent to Transylvania, according to Maniu, to 
assist in the fighting against the Germans. Custody of the Marshal was 
therefore left in the hands of Bodnara§ whose group was the only one to 
appear at the palace.18 
Also taken to the house in Vatra Luminoasa were Antonescu’s fellow 
ministers, General Constantin Pantazi, Minister of Defence, General 
Dumitru Popescu, Minister of the Interior, General Constantin Vasiliu, 
Under-secretary of State at the Interior Ministry, and Colonel Mircea 
Elefterescu, head of Bucharest Police. On 31 August, two days after 
Soviet troops entered Bucharest, the group was handed over by 
Bodnara§ into the custody of Lt. Gen. Tevcenkov and Maj. Gen. Nikolai 
Burenin, the commander of Soviet forces in Bucharest, on orders 
issued by General (later Marshal) Rodion Malinovski, Commander of 
Soviet operations in Romania.19 
King Michael was still at a mountain retreat in the Carpathians, 
having left the capital for fear that it might fall to the Germans in the 
early hours of 24 August. With or without the King’s presence, at the 
time when the Antonescus were handed over to the Soviet authorities the 
latter were in a position to impose their will without hindrance. 
Romania was now an occupied country and it is difficult to see how the 
King could have intervened against his new ally to prevent them taking 
a leader who had conducted hostilities against them during the previous 
1 8 Ionnijiu, ‘23 August 1994’, p. 574. 
1 9 On the following day, the group was taken by train to Moscow and held until 
May 1946 in a castle some 60 km outside the Russian capital. According to an 
account written by Pantazi’s son, they were well treated (Ion Pantazi, ‘O marturie 
indirecta despre 23 august’, Apozi$ia, Munich, 1980-81, pp. 20-30. At the end 
of April 1946 all six were sent back to Bucharest to stand trial as ‘war criminals’. 
On 17 May Marshal Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu, Pantazi, Vasiliu, Gheorghe 
Alexianu, the former Governor of Transnistria, Radu Lecca, former chief of 
Jewish Affairs, and Eugen Cristescu, head of Intelligence Service were sentenced 
to death. All, except the Marshal, lodged appeals and Cristescu, Lecca and 
Pantazi had their sentences commuted by the King, with the consent of 
government acting on the advice of the Soviet authorities. The Marshal’s mother 
appealed to the King for clemency but, acting on the advice of the government, he 
denied her request. The two Antonescus, Alexianu and Vasiliu, were executed by 
firing squad in the grounds of Jilava prison at 6 pm on 1 June 1946. 
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three years. Those who argue that the King should have done so ignore 
the realities of the time. 
What emerges from this description of the preparations for the coup 
and its implementation is that the Romanian Communists were but one 
of a number of players in the coup. Their part was defined by a number 
of considerations. As a party with little popular support within 
Romania, the Communists’ importance in shaping the country’s future 
depended on the influence their sponsor, Stalin, was able to wield in 
Romanian affairs and as the war progressed that importance was 
magnified by the advance of the Red Army. The inclusion of 
representatives of the Romanian Communist Party in the National 
Democratic Bloc was therefore sound politics, being regarded by the 
King and the major opposition leaders as tactful in view of the 
impending entry of the Red Army onto Romanian soil and the lead that 
the Soviet Union would take in determining the conditions of an 
armistice. But having said that, the Communists were allowed to play a 
bigger part in the coup because of the lapses of the other parties. These 
were compounded by the Communists’ superior organization on the 
evening of the coup. Patra§canu was the first party representative to 
appear at the palace on 23 August; Maniu and Bratianu could not be 
contacted, and Bodnara§ and his ‘Patriotic Guards’ were the only 
civilian militia to arrive to take charge of Antonescu. These facts were 
used by the Communists to underpin their exaggerated claim to have 
played the leading role in the coup. 
5 
The Overthrow of Nicolae Ceau§escu 
PETER SIANI-DAVIES 
Five years have passed since the events which have popularly come to be 
known as the Romanian Revolution and it now seems appropriate to take 
stock and try and offer a history of the period leading to the overthrow of 
Nicolae Ceau§escu. As an event the revolution passed extremely rapidly 
with little more than one week elapsing between the first demonstrations 
in Timi§oara, outside the house of the Hungarian pastor, Laszlo Tdkes, 
and the final flight of Ceau^escu from the Central Committee building in 
Bucharest. This brief period can broadly be divided into three phases. 
The first of these began in Timisoara on the 15 December and was 
characterized by escalating street protests, frequently violent, by a 
disorganized crowd. These were brought to an abrupt halt on the 17 
December when a brutal repression by the authorities drove the crowd 
from the streets of the city. Tentative signs of the second phase of 
protests began to emerge on the next day. More organized and largely 
peaceful in form and centred on the industrial workforce, these occurred 
initially within the factories but on the 20 December they spilled out into 
a huge demonstration in the centre of the city which directly led to the 
collapse of official rule in Timisoara. The third phase was to see the 
unrest spread out from beyond Timisoara first to surrounding towns in 
the Banat like Buzia§ and Lugoj and, then, to other major cities and many 
smaller towns, largely in Transylvania but also including some centres 
such as Or§ova and Ploie§ti, that lay just inside Oltenia and Muntenia.1 
Most significantly unrest also spread to Bucharest. In many of the smaller 
towns the overthrow of Ceau§escu was to pass peacefully, but in several 
of the larger cities and, especially, Bucharest, Cluj and Sibiu a pattern of 
events was to unfold similar to those in Timisoara, as violent street 
demonstrations were followed by repression which in turn led to mass 
protests. These rapidly undercut the last shreds of legitimacy held by the 
regime leading the security forces to withdraw their support and making 
the position of Ceau§escu untenable. 
Considering the outbreak of unrest first, the pattern of the initial phase 
of the revolution was of a steadily increasing escalation in the scale of the 
Some indication of the events in the various counties of Romania can be found 
in Petre Popa and Ilie §tefan, ‘Ieri la Timisoara, azi in toatajara!’, Romania lb- 
22 decembrie: singe, durere, speranta 1989-1990, Bucharest, n.d., pp. 22-28. 
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protest matched by a growing radicalization of the crowd. The 15 
December saw only a small demonstration by a core of less than one 
hundred protesters, mostly elderly members of Tdkes’s congregation. 
Despite the fact that such a gathering blatantly contravened the draconian 
public assembly laws, no attempt was made to clear the crowds by force 
and the demonstration seems to have by and large dissolved peacefully. 
The next day a crowd of about seventy again gathered before swelling by 
nightfall to a thousand or more in number. As the proportion of Tdkes’s 
parishioners became diluted, the mood of the crowd began to grow 
perceptibly more radical. Already the night before there had been cries 
for ‘Liberty’ and the Mayor had been so abused that Tdkes had feared his 
life might be at risk, but, now, as the slogans moved from material 
concerns for better living conditions to explicit attacks on the Romanian 
leadership, Tdkes was to write that he felt a mere prisoner of the crowd’s 
anger.2 Instead of the Hungarian pastor the predominantly Romanian and 
youthful crowd began to throw up its own leaders, some of whom 
scrambled to address the throng from the buffers of trams stranded 
amongst the heaving mass. Then, becoming markedly more aggressive, 
the crowd started to smash shop windows in the streets around Tdkes’s 
church before the vast bulk began to drift towards other areas of the city. 
The two largest groups headed for the students’ halls of residence and the 
building of the County Council of the Romanian Communist Party, 
which they appear to have unsuccessfully attempted to enter. As the night 
wore on, there was rioting in several parts of Timisoara and, as windows 
were smashed and vehicles burnt, the demonstrators increasingly came 
into conflict with the security forces, which by the end of the evening 
appear to have included the army. 
The 17 December was a Sunday and the absence of work and a 
curiosity to see the devastation caused by the rioting of the night before 
led even larger crowds to gather, but, this time, not around Tdkes’s 
church, which was sealed off after his forcible removal in the early hours 
of the morning, but in the main squares in the centre of the city. Around 
midday a large section of these crowds once more approaching the 
County Council building came into conflict with the security forces and 
in the pitched battle that ensued the protesters were eventually able to 
push the defenders’ cordon far enough back to allow a small group of 
youths to enter the building and ransack the lower floors — an incident 
which seems to have further persuaded Ceau§escu of the necessity of 
ruthlessly crushing the demonstrations.3 
For Tdkes’s recollections of these days see Laszlo T6kes, With God, For the 
People: the Autobiography of Laszlo Tokes, London, 1990, pp. 1-20, 145-66; 
also Felix Corley and John Eibner, In the Eye of the Romanian Storm, Old 
Tappen, New Jersey, 1990, pp. 17-37. 
For a number of accounts of these events, see Miodrag Milin, Timisoara: 15-21 
decembrie ’89, Timisoara, 1990, pp. 51-62, and Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu 
sufletul la gura: traseele revolutiei, Timi§oara, 1990, pp. 73-92. These two 
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The security forces eventually resecured control of the building, but 
chaos continued to reign elsewhere in the centre of the city as groups of 
stone-throwing demonstrators broke windows at will and set newspaper 
kiosks and vehicles on fire. Simultaneously, in a southern suburb another 
group of protesters had sprung an effective ambush on six tanks, trapping 
them between barricades and building works and forcing their crews to 
leave them abandoned.* * * 4 Thus, by late afternoon on the 17 December the 
authorities had effectively lost control of the centre of Timisoara, which 
was being ransacked by an angry crowd — some gauge of the scale of the 
unrest comes from official assessments that at this time over 300 shops 
were damaged at a cost of 5,000 million lei — and six tanks had fallen 
into the hands of the demonstrators, presaging a potentially dangerous 
escalation of the conflict.5 
The response of the authorities to these events had often been so 
belated and lacking in decisive action that the agenda for much of the 
first part of the revolution was effectively set by the demonstrator. This, 
in part, seems to be because in dealing with Tdkes the authorities appear 
to have been operating under a number of constraints, some self-imposed, 
others forced upon them. Firstly, their actions seem to have been 
tempered to a certain extent by a desire not to overly antagonize world 
public opinion. Tdkes was already something of an international cause 
celebre, featuring regularly on Hungarian radio and in reports carried by 
all the main Western shortwave radio stations broadcast to Romania, so 
that, by December 1989, there seems to have been a general 
consciousness of his protest, not only in Timi§oara and Romania but also 
within the wider world.6 One consequence of this was that both the US 
and British Embassies dispatched officials to Timisoara to report on the 
situation and it may have been their presence on the morning of the 15 
December that dissuaded the authorities from taking more decisive 
action.7 The authorities were also constrained by Ceau§escu’s apparent 
valuable books each containing dozens of eyewitness testimonies are the best 
sources for the events in Timisoara. I am grateful to Dennis Deletant for 
securing for me Milin’s book. In English see Nestor Ratesh, Romania: the 
Entangled Revolution, The Washington Papers 152, New York, 1991, pp. 17-34, 
and Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil: a Contemporary History, London and 
New York, 1992, pp. 91-98. 
4 For full details of this event in Calea Girocului see the various testimonies to be 
found in Milin, Timi§oara: 15-21 decembrie ’89, pp. 79-95, and Suciu, Reportaj 
cu sufletul la gura, pp. 66-124. 
This figure is given in ‘Raportul Comisiei Senatoriale Pentru Cercetarea 
Evenimentelor din Decembrie 1989: Secpunea 3. Evenimentele desfa§urate in 
perioada 16-22.12.1989 in municipiul Bucuresfi. 1. Acjiunile foijelor aparfinind 
M.Ap.N. in gamizoana Bucure§ti in perioada 16-22.12.1989.’, Adevarul, ‘Edijie 
speciala’, 25 May 1992, p. 1. 
6 Tdkes had a long history as a turbulent priest often at loggerheads with the 
authorities. For details of his troubles during 1989 see T6kes, With God, For the 
People, pp. 124-44. 
7 Ibid., p. 7, and Corley and Eibner, In the Eye of the Romanian Storm, p. 21. 
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insistence that the removal of T6kes should conform to some form of 
spurious legality. Before the eviction order was secured, the proceedings 
had dragged on through the best part of a whole year of legal wrangling, 
and after it was served there still seemed to be a reluctance to openly 
employ force — T6kes was, eventually, spirited away in the middle of 
the night.8 
The authorities initially appear to have believed that the problem 
could be solved by negotiations, but these were carried out on the 15 and 
16 December at the lowest possible level by the Mayor of Timisoara, 
Petru Mof; no national figures were present nor even the local county 
leadership, who might have mustered more authority. Then, when the 
situation escalated and the regime decided to switch to a policy of 
repression, the numbers of troops initially deployed were insufficient for 
the task, allowing the demonstrators to achieve minor victories such as 
the ransacking of a fire engine, which built their confidence for future 
confrontations. Throughout, the central authorities displayed a marked 
lack of trust in the local personnel and there were frequent breakdowns of 
communication in the complex chain of command that had Ceau§escu 
himself at its head. Indeed, it seems to have been at his insistence that the 
military leadership adopted the singularly inappropriate tactics of 
deploying tanks against the fast moving stone-throwing demonstrators 
with serious consequences for the dimensions of the conflict.9 The 
absence of decisive action by the authorities at the onset permitted the 
conflict to spread beyond the confines of the area around Tdkes’s church 
across the Bega Canal into the centre of Timisoara, thereby escalating the 
situation from a relatively minor local problem to one that would shake 
the very foundations of the regime. 
This inability of the authorities to control the situation at its earliest 
stages was to lead, during the evening of the 17 December, to a brutal and 
bloody repression of the demonstrations. Following the arrival of senior 
military commanders from Bucharest, the security forces threw a cordon 
around the centre of the city, slowly squeezing the demonstrators into the 
Opera Square. Earlier in the day, there seems to have been some isolated 
shooting but now, at around 7.00 in the evening, the firing began in 
earnest and in the ensuing carnage, both in the centre of Timisoara and in 
several outlying districts, over sixty civilians were to die and 250 were to 
be wounded.10 
8 Details of Tdkes’s brutal removal from Timisoara can be found in T6kes, With 
God, For the People, pp. 161-72. 
This becomes clear from the Political Executive Committee transcript released 
after the events. It is reproduced in ‘Ordin clar “TrageJiF”, Romania Libera, 10 
January 1990, p. 3. 
10 This is the figure of casualties in the main hospital of Timisoara in the early 
hours of the morning of 18 December. It is quite possible that more casualties 
were at some of the other hospitals in the town and there are also many reports 
that a large number of the wounded refused to go to hospital for fear of the 
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From the 18 December with the security forces patrolling the streets 
and a state of emergency applied in Timisoara in all but name, as people 
were instructed to pass only two at a time and any larger gathering was 
quickly broken up, the protests were driven from the streets into the only 
alternative place of mass socialization that was available, the factory 
workplace.* 11 The Communist penchant for constructing big factories in 
even larger industrial complexes allowed for a concentration of sentiment 
and facilitated the free flow of information amongst the workforce. The 
passage of news about the disturbances was now further aided by the 
authorities, who ordered the convening of a series of workplace meetings 
in the hope of mobilizing the workers against the demonstrators. 
Ostensibly held to ‘explain’ the events and denounce the perpetrators as 
‘hooligans’, these meetings for most workers merely offered 
confirmation of the rumours about the extent of the damage and unrest 
and, indeed, amongst the commuters from outside Timisoara, who until 
that point had probably little idea of the events which had occurred in the 
city over the weekend, they served to inform them of what had happened. 
Often given by representatives of the county Party leadership or higher 
management, these speeches appear to have normally been heard in 
silence, but in some of the larger factories, such as Electrobanat, they 
seem to have provided a forum for debate.12 After preliminary meetings 
with senior management and officials from the county leadership, section 
heads returned to address their workmates, but not holding the same 
stamp of authority as senior officials their accounts sometimes led to 
cross-questioning and heated debate, thereby providing a platform for the 
airing of views critical of the regime. 
As well as trying to mobilize the workforce in its support at the same 
time the regime also made an attempt to disguise the extent of the 
massacre by taking forty bodies from the mortuary at Timi§oara for 
incineration in Bucharest.13 However, by closing the mortuary area for 
the duration of this operation the authorities only prompted the spread of 
Securitate. Milin, Timisoara: 15-21 decembrie ’89, p. 101, and Suciu, Reportaj 
cu sufletul la gura, p. 134. 
11 A state of emergency in Timi§ county was only officially instituted by 
presidential decree on 21 December. For the text of the decree translated into 
English see BBC Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcasts. Part 2 Eastern 
Europe, EE/0646, B/2-3, 22 December 1989, Agerpres in English, 0910 gmt, 21 
December 1989. 
12 A famous exception to the general rule of silence was the speech given by 
Claudiu Iordache at his institute IPROTIM. See George Galloway and Bob 
Wylie, Downfall: the Ceauyescus and the Romanian Revolution, London, 1991, 
p. 124. 
13 For a full account of this incident see the summary of the facts from the Military 
Procurator reprinted in Filip Teodorescu, Un rise asumat: Timi§oara decembrie 
1989, Bucharest, 1992, pp. 294-99, together with the eyewitness accounts in 
Suciu, Reportaj cu sufletul la gura, pp. 151-54, 160-63. Details of the identity of 
the corpses removed from the mortuary appear in ‘Primim de la asociapa “17 
decembrie” Timisoara’, Adevarul, 13 March 1991, p. 5. 
42 THE OVERTHROW OF CEAU§ESCU 
rumours, and one of the most emotive and sustained rallying cries 
amongst the demonstrators during the days that followed was for the 
return of the bodies for decent Christian burial. The circumstances 
surrounding the disappearance of these bodies also seem to lie at the root 
of continuing uncertainty over the real death toll during the revolution in 
Timi§oara. 
Indeed, as the unrest progressed, rumours and myths became 
increasingly significant in mobilizing the crowd. Two incidents in 
particular came to be seen as symbolizing the conflict. On 18 December, 
in the late afternoon, troops opened fire on a group of young protesters 
gathered on the steps of the Cathedral, leaving a twenty-two-year-old 
man dead. Until this point the precincts of the Cathedral seem to have 
come to represent an ideal of protection and sanctuary in the minds of 
many of the protesters — a place at which the forces of repression would 
not dare shoot. Thus, when it occurred, this incident, underpinned by 
ideas of sacrilege, seems to have embodied the image of a Manichean 
battle between good and evil, vividly striking the popular imagination 
and leading to a perceptible rise in tension.14 
The next day the workers at Electrobanat occupied their factory and 
refusing to work, called for negotiations to settle their grievances — 
amongst which seems to have been demands for the withdrawal of the 
army from the area. Senior Party officials arrived to try and persuade the 
workers to return to work and as the negotations continued a crowd 
gathered outside the factory on the bridge over the canal. Shortly 
afterwards, the security forces opened fire, injuring and possibly killing 
some of the crowd and sparking off extensive rioting throughout the 
area.15 The rumours following this incident were particularly graphic, the 
most striking being that a young boy had been shot and his body thrown 
into the Bega Canal. The strike at ELBA and the shooting and rioting in 
the area weaved a further strand in the mythology of the revolution. 
Gradually, as the rumours spread, the events seem to have become 
conflated and the distinction between factory and street blurred — the 
news was not only of a strike but also of shootings at ELBA. Instead of a 
single person, Tdkes, the symbol of the revolution, had now become a 
whole factory.16 Soon sympathy strikes were being reported, and the next 
day, as the strikers marched from their factories towards the centre of the 
city, slogans were chanted in support of the ELBA workers and the main 
column even marched across Timisoara to the factory before turning 
towards the centre. The violence of that day also heralded the failure of 
14 For details see Milin, Timi§oara: 15-21 decembrie ’89, p. 109, and Suciu, 
Reportaj cu sufletul la gura, pp. 154-58. 
15 For full accounts of these incidents see Milin, Timisoara: 15-21 decembrie ’89, 
pp. 112-14; Suciu, Reportaj cu sufletul la gura, pp. 164-65, 174-76, and Ion 
Pachia Tatomirescu, ‘Nopjile zilele revolujiei romane din decembrie 1989, la 
Timisoara’ in Timisoara 16-22 decembrie 1989, Timisoara, 1990, pp. 152-64. 
16 Milin, Timisoara: 15-21 decembrie ’89, p. 116. 
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the policy of repression. Even with such large numbers of troops and 
armoured vehicles in the city the authorities seemed powerless to halt 
further outbreaks of unrest, and during the coming day their resolve was 
to be tested until it broke. 
Faced by this growing unrest in the factories the authorities seemed to 
have returned to the idea of a negotiated settlement based on a belief that 
the majority of the workers remained basically loyal to the regime. On 
the morning of 20 December representatives of the local Party leadership 
again went to the largest of the local factories to speak to the workers and 
try to get them to return to work and later in the day the Prime Minister, 
Constantin Dascalescu, on the model of the regime’s response to the 
earlier Bra§ov riots of 1987, arrived in Timi§oara to negotiate with 
representatives of the protesters and, it seems, he was also expected to 
address a massed rally in Opera Square later in the day. 
However, such plans were to founder on a massive display of protest 
as huge numbers of workers poured out of the factories and formed 
several long columns of marchers which snaked their way through the 
city to the centre. The exact circumstances out of which the protests grew 
are not entirely clear, but, it seems, that at some factories the 
management do appear to have locked doors in an attempt to prevent the 
workforce from leaving the premises, whilst in others the workers 
themselves were divided between those who wished to stay united and 
protected within the workplace and those who wished to run the risk of 
dispersement on the streets. At some points troops do appear to have tried 
to bar the way of the columns as they approached the centre — whether 
shots were fired in an attempt to disperse the crowds is unclear — but 
they were overwhelmed by sheer numbers, and, surrounded by a sea of 
protesters, the army was effectively neutralized as a fighting force in 
Timisoara. Instead of Dascalescu, the assembled masses in the Opera 
Square were to hear a local Professor, Lorin Fortuna, who was to be the 
first leader of the revolution in Timisoara. 
At the same time another section of the crowd moved to the County 
Council building and here a small delegation of between thirteen and 
eighteen protesters entered into negotiations with Dascalescu, Emil Bobu 
and other members of the Party leadership.17 The negotiating group seem 
to have been a genuine ad hoc construction, spanning a wide range of 
professions and places of employment with none of the representatives 
being publicly known before the revolution. The talks took place against 
continuous chanting by the protesters outside. No agenda had been 
agreed beforehand and, at first, the demands were almost entirely 
concerned with the situation in Timisoara, being in many ways little more 
than a coherent articulation of the slogans of the demonstrators. However, 
as the afternoon progressed, a more radical position seems to have 
17 For an account of the negotiations by one of the participants see Suciu, Reportaj 
cu sufletul la gura, pp. 215-29. 
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evolved with demands for the resignation of Ceau§escu and his 
government and calls for free elections coming to the fore. Eventually, 
the talks seem to have ground into a stalemate with Dascalescu playing 
for time by constantly referring to the need to confer with Bucharest. It 
became clear that the authorities were only willing to concede three of the 
lesser demands guaranteeing the immunity of the delegates, the release of 
detainees and the return of the bodies of the dead, and after Ceau§escu’s 
uncompromising speech at 7.00 in the evening, in which he blamed the 
disturbances on hooligans and foreign provocateurs and offered no 
respite from the road of socialist construction, the negotations fizzled 
out.18 
Dascalescu, Bobu and their entourage returned to Bucharest and a 
period of uneasy stalemate followed in Timisoara, with the authorities 
remaining in control of the County Council building whilst the 
demonstrators established their own centre of power at the Opera House. 
However, victory was far from assured and on the evening of the 20 and 
morning of the 21 December Ceau§escu made a further attempt to restore 
order in the city through the dispatch of fifteen train loads of crudely 
armed workers from Oltenia. However, when the first trains pulled into 
Timisoara South station they found nobody to meet them except for a few 
hundred protesters. Tired, hungry and confused, most remained waiting 
on the trains until they could return home.19 
Afterwards, rumous of approaching troop trains and other dangers 
continued to circulate, and the next day, amidst the prevailing uncertainty 
as the numbers on the balcony of the Opera swelled, it soon became clear 
that there was little cohesion amongst the leaders of the revolution. Over 
many long years they had painfully been schooled in the expression of 
dissatisfaction but they had little understanding of the needs in 
constructing a revolution and, now, as the putative leaders attempted to 
draw up a programme, suspicions and frictions came to the fore. It was in 
this atmosphere that Radu Balan, the Party Secretary of the county, 
appears to have been asked by some of the protesters to join the 
leadership. In general, he seems to have been not unpopular in the city — 
18 A translation of Ceau§escu’s speech can be found in BBC, EE/0646, B/l-2, 22 
December 1989, Bucharest Home Service, 1700 gmt, 20 December 1989. After 
the speech workplace meetings were convened across Romania to denounce the 
events in Timisoara. Those in Bucharest seem to have been addressed by union 
and works’ Party officials, not by major political figures. For accounts of such 
meetings, together with photographs showing obviously unenthusiastic workers, 
see Tntreaga najiune, in deplina unitate in jurul partidului, este hotarita sa-§i 
apere cu fermitate cuceririle revolujionare, independent §i integritatea patriei, 
sa continue neabatut construcpa socialist;!’, Romania Libera, 21 December 
1989, p. 2. 
19 Seven trains departed from Craiova, three from Rimnicu Vilcea, two from 
Slatina and one each from Draga§ani, Caracal and Bal^. For details see Milin, 
Timisoara: 15-21 decembrie ’89, pp. 170-71 and Suciu, Reportaj cu sufletul la 
gura, p. 211. 
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he was applauded when he first spoke from the Opera balcony. His return 
may have been partly accepted because of the growing chaos in 
Timi§oara and the need to normalize the situation to ensure a return to 
work and the regular supply of foodstuffs, but it may also have been a 
deliberate attempt by some of his rivals to undercut the power base of 
Fortuna.20 By the morning of the 22 December events in Timisoara had 
followed a course which Bucharest was soon to emulate, as young and 
inexperienced demonstrators tried to come to terms with ‘untainted’ 
representatives of the old regime. 
Meanwhile, as suggested in the earlier typology, the unrest had spread 
well beyond the bounds of the Banat to encompass many of the 
population centres of Transylvania as well as Bucharest. After Ceau§escu 
arrived back from Iran in the afternoon of the 20 December he ordered 
the convening of a huge mass demonstration for the next morning in the 
centre of Bucharest. The meeting was to be covered live on national 
television and radio, with the intention of demonstrating to the wider 
Romanian public that the regime continued to enjoy popular support and 
thereby legitimizing the repression of the demonstrations in Timisoara. 
Given the rising tensions it was a high risk strategy, but by seeing the 
unrest in Timisoara as the work of a few foreign agents and domestic 
malcontents Ceau§escu seems to have been able to convince himself that 
the vast bulk of the population could be relied upon to rally to his cause 
once the situation was clearly explained to them. To a large extent, 
Ceau§escu’s position was based on a mythologized view of 1968 when, 
in a rousing rally in the centre of Bucharest, he had condemned the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and made a stirring declaration 
of Romania’s national independence of action. At the time, this had won 
him great popular acclaim and, now, although he was aware that the 
situation was more serious than in 1968, he seems to have believed that 
the threat to Romania’s territorial sovereignty was such as to permit him 
to successfully play the same national card for a second time. However, 
this time Ceau§escu’s efforts to rally the population to his side were only 
to reveal the weakness of his position, and the look of startled 
bemusement that crossed his face following disturbances in the crowd 
during the rally only seems to have confirmed for many Romanians the 
frailty of the regime’s grasp on power.21 
The meeting broke up peremptorily and soon the events in Bucharest 
began to follow a course similar to those in Timisoara as scattered groups 
of youths moved through a larger crowd of onlookers and passing 
shoppers shouting slogans and urging their fellow citizens to join them in 
protest. Shop windows were broken and the security forces moved in to 
20 At least this seems to have been the intention of Ion Savu who says it was he 
who fetched Balan to the Opera. His testimony can be found in Suciu, Reportaj 
cu sufletul la gura, pp. 246-48. 
21 For a translation of Ceau^escu’s speech see BBC, EE/0647, B/5-6, 23 December 
1989, Bucharest Home Service, 1031 gmt, 21 December 1989. 
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disperse the protesters with tear gas and baton charges. The largest group 
of demonstrators gathered outside the Intercontinental Hotel in Piafa 
Universitajii and here, at around 5.00 in the afternoon, after an incident 
involving a military lorry, the security forces opened fire on the crowd.22 
In the night of rioting that followed over fifty demonstrators were killed 
and 460 others wounded before order was restored in the early hours of 
the morning. 
As in Timisoara this repression appears to have merely triggered off 
further mass protests since early the next morning large concentrations of 
demonstrators began to march towards the centre of Bucharest. Again the 
exact circumstances are not clear, but in various places troops seem to 
have tried to halt the oncoming masses only to be overwhelmed by the 
huge number of protesters. Advancing to the centre somewhat 
surprisingly, the crowd found the security forces pulling back from the 
huge square outside the Central Committee building and thereby freeing 
access to the very centre of power. The order for the withdrawal seems to 
have been given at 10.45 with the process beginning at 11.00, but 
whether it was given independently of Ceau§escu or with his sanction 
remains one of the chief mysteries of the revolution.23 Already by mid- 
morning military discipline had effectively collapsed as, isolated in a sea 
of demonstrators, detachments of soldiers began to fraternize with the 
civilian population. The standard remedy in such situations is to 
withdraw the troops involved and replace them with others drawn from 
elsewhere. This occurred in China at the time of the Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations and it may be that in Bucharest the withdrawal of the 
troops was also merely a strategic response to the prevailing military 
situation. It also seems that Ceau§escu, perhaps sensing that the army 
could not stem the tide of protests, preferred to place his faith in one last 
attempt to address ‘his’ people whilst at the same time taking the prudent 
step of ordering helicopters in case an evacuation was necessary. He was 
expected to make another attempt to address the nation from the TV 
studios in the Central Committee building at 13.00, but, before then, he 
seems to have ordered the organization of another mass rally and for the 
crowd to assemble the square had to be cleared.24 Whatever, a large 
22 For this incident see ‘Raportul Comisiei Senatoriale Pentru Cercetarea 
Evenimentelor din Decembrie 1989: Secpunea 3.1\ Adevarul, ‘Edipe speciala’, 
25 May 1992, p. 2, and for a view from the side of the protesters with broadly 
the same details but differing interpretations see ‘Ei, tinerii, au facut revolupa. 
Ei, tinerii, scriu istoria’, Magazin Istoric, seria noua, vol. 24, 1990, no. 2, p. 6. 
23 ‘Raportul Comisiei Senatoriale Pentru Cercetarea Evenimentelor din Decembrie 
1989: Secpunea 3.1’, Adevarul, ‘Edipe speciala’, 25 May 1992, p. 3. 
24 Televiziunea Romana, Revolupa Romana in direct, Bucharest, 1990, p. 177. At 
his trial Dinca stated that on the morning of 22 December Elena Ceau^escu 
ordered him to proceed to the ‘23 August’ factory to organize the workers to 
march to the centre. However, at the same time Barbu Petrescu, the Mayor of 
Bucharest, appeared and at Dinca’s suggestion he was dispatched instead. 
‘Procesul a inceput: din rechizitoriul Procuraturii generale’, Adevarul, 28 
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crowd gathered and, when Ceau§escu appeared on the balcony at 
approximately 11.30 and began to speak, he was soon interrupted by boos 
and catcalls and ushered away from the scene. Then, the crowd rushed 
the doors of the Central Committee building and, meeting little 
opposition, streamed inside. In front of them the Ceau§escus in an 
undignified scramble fled to the roof where a waiting helicopter took off 
at 12.08 carrying them, Emil Bobu, Manea Manescu and two members of 
the presidential bodyguard first to Snagov and, then, following a farcical, 
almost tragi-comical series of events, which saw the presidential couple 
bundled from one car to another, to the point where they were detained in 
Tirgovi^te 25 
The abandonment of the regime by the security forces made the 
position of Ceau§escu untenable. As early as the 16 December the cry 
‘The Army is with us!’ had been on the lips of the demonstrators in 
Timi§oara, but it was not until the 22 December that the popular refrain 
found response. This persistent belief that the army would eventually side 
with the people both encouraged the demonstrators and sapped the 
morale of the military. To be effectively used as an instrument of 
repression within a revolutionary context an army must hold imprinted 
loyalties which give it a sense of institutional separateness. The largely 
conscript (75%) Romanian army, with only a sixteen-month period of 
military service, seems to have developed no such sense of separation, 
and, unwilling to countenance excessive employment on domestic 
civilian populations, both in Timisoara and Bucharest it effectively 
collapsed as a disciplined force after a single operation. Before December 
1989 there seems to have been considerable dissatisfaction within the 
army both amongst the conscripts, who were often used as a form of 
forced labour on industrial projects, and within the officer corp where 
there appears to have been much resentment at what amounted to a 
gradual deprofessionalization of the military.26 This lack of institutional 
January 1990, p. 3. For the view of the protesters see Richard Donkin, ‘I’ve 
waited all my life for this’, Financial Times, 23 December 1989, p. 2. 
25 There are many accounts of the flight of the Ceau§escus and although most are 
rather full of hyperbole and implausibly contrast the pitiful and dejected state of 
the Ceau§escus with the heroism of those who were forced to drive them the 
basic facts seem to be fairly uniformly acknowledged even if the motives of 
many of the participants still remain unclear. For some accounts in English see 
Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, pp. 70-73; Edward Behr, Kiss the 
Hand You Cannot Bite: the Rise and Fall of the Ceau§escus, London, 1991, pp. 
4-13; John Simpson, The Darkness Crumbles: Despatches from the Barricades 
Revised and Updated, London, 1992, pp. 279-85; Mark Almond, The Rise and 
Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceau§escu, London, 1992, pp. 13-18, 230-31, and 
John Sweeny, The Life and Evil Times of Nicolae Ceau§escu, London, 1991, pp. 
213-14,218-21. 
26 In 1985 in response to severe shortages of electrical power the military were 
drafted into power stations but the exercise does not seem to have been an 
unalloyed success. See Paul Gafton, ‘The State of Emergency and the 
Militarization of Power Industry’, Radio Free Europe Research, Romanian 
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separateness and the disaffection of both the conscripts and the officer 
corp was inadvertently fused by Ceau§escu through his espousal of a 
nationalist ideology.27 Nationalism stressed the same patriotic values that 
lay at the heart of the military value system thereby reestablishing the 
organic relationship between the army and nation, which had been diluted 
by internationalist tendencies in the immediate years after the Communist 
takeover when the Red Army was stationed in Romania. Following the 
embracement of nationalism, the Romanian army took on a renewed 
importance as the schoolroom of the nation in that it was the chief forum 
for patriotic socialization. This led to a widespread tendency both within 
the ranks of the military and within the people as a whole to identify the 
army with the nation, that is ‘the people’ at their widest extent, and on the 
streets of Timisoara and Bucharest this led the protesters to chant at the 
troops: ‘We are the people, who do you defend?’ In contrast, the 
Securitate were almost exclusively identified in the popular mind with the 
state, an important distinction which was to come to the fore during the 
next phase of the revolution. 
Situation Report 16, 14 November 1985, pp. 7-11; idem, ‘The Electricity 
Crisis’, Radio Free Europe Research, Romanian Situation Report 17, 17 
December 1985, pp. 27-32. In 1988 soldiers were reported to be building the 
Deva-Brad railway and apartments in Bucharest. See The RUSI Soviet-Warsaw 
Pact Yearbook 1989, Coulsdon, 1989-90, p. 270. For the Romanian army in the 
late 1980s see also Daniel N. Nelson, Romanian Politics in the Ceau§escu Era, 
New York, 1988, pp. 175-95, and Jonathan Eyal, ‘Romania: Between 
Appearances and Realities’ in Jonathan Eyal (ed.), The Warsaw Pact and the 
Balkans: Moscow’s Southern Flank, RUSI Defence Studies, Basingstoke and 
London, 1989, pp. 67-108. 
‘The period that youth spends in the army must give them not only thorough 
military knowledge but also a rich political and cultural knowledge. We must 
not for a minute forget that the army must be, par excellence, an advanced 
school of political and patriotic education [dedicated to] the formation of the 
new man, the builder of multilaterally developed socialist society.’ Nicolae 
Ceau§escu, Scinteia, 3 October 1976, quoted in Walter M. Bacon Jnr, ‘The 
Military and the Party in Romania’ in Dale R. Herspring & Ivan Volgyes (eds), 
Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, Boulder, Colorado, 1978, p. 
173. 
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Romania’s Role in Post-Cold War Central Europe 
ELENA ZAMFIRESCU 
Condemned to oblivion for almost forty-five years, the term ‘Central 
Europe’ has gradually re-entered political discourse. Before 1989 it was 
used intermittently solely by emigre intellectuals from the countries in 
that region, but since 1990 it has gained fashionable currency in 
contemporary political analyses. 
Two reasons lie behind its disappearance from the geopolitical 
representations of the period 1945-89. The first was the post-war 
extension of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence in Europe up to the 
Elba and Greece, which led to most of the area previously designated 
Central Europe being termed, together with the whole of the Soviet 
Union, ‘Eastern Europe’. The second had much to do with the defeat, and 
indeed the failure, of the Third Reich’s attempt to carve a Central Europe 
(Mitteleuropa) under German domination. 
It is as a consequence of the success of the post-1989 changes in 
Europe that the term ‘Central Europe’ has been resurrected: with their 
full political independence restored, the former Soviet satellites have also 
regained their geopolitical identity. As early as the spring of 1990, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski astutely observed that: 
Today, Eastern Europe is again Central Europe — which it has always been 
historically, culturally and philosophically. The correct geographic 
designation of the area involved is also Central Europe — even though for 
half a century it was misleadingly labelled as Eastern Europe ... The fact is 
that the terms ‘Eastern Europe’ and ‘Western Europe’, as employed over the 
last several decades, were not geographic but geopolitical designations. They 
reflected the post-Yalta political division of Europe. Today, it is the Soviet 
Union that is again Europe’s true geographic and geopolitical East.1 
Two years later, an important political document, ‘The Declaration of 
the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with the 
States of Central Europe’, issued on 19 June 1992, at Petersberg 
(Germany), recognized the re-establishment of Central Europe. Its first 
paragraph identifies Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (as it was then), Estonia, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Beyond Chaos. A Policy for the West’, The National 
Interest, Spring 1990, pp. 3-4. Although Brzezinski’s formulation needs to be 
brought up to date by replacing the Soviet Union with the Russian Federation, 
his main point still stands. 
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Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania as ‘States of Central 
Europe’. Far from endorsing the questionable opinion that post-Cold War 
Central Europe would include just three or four countries, the document 
suggests instead that the area in point could hardly be reduced to the nine 
enumerated countries, which are not, after all, identified as ‘the states of 
Central Europe’, but as ‘states of Central Europe’. Unfortunately, this 
linguistic and perceptual change is not reflected in many journalistic or 
academic articles.2 Political representatives of some of the WEU’s 
member countries and associated partners (the nine countries defined as 
‘States of Central Europe’) continue to speak as if the document had not 
been adopted. 
The pertinence of a broader definition of Central Europe is also 
corroborated by the membership of a post-1989 sub-regional grouping 
which calls itself the Central European Initiative. Even though, for the 
time being, it comprises — besides Austria and Italy — just eight of the 
new democracies in the area that stretches from the Baltic Sea to the 
Adriatic and the Black Sea, the presence of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia- 
Hercegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia among its 
members clearly indicates that Central Europe does not stop on the 
northern bank of the Danube. Given that the population of the latter two 
states is overwhelmingly made up of ‘non-Western Christians’, this 
grouping has also the merit of practically rejecting the idea that the 
eastern and southern borders of Central Europe would overlap with the 
religious ‘fault line’ of the year 1500. 
Reacting to the growing neglect by Western scholars in the Cold War 
period of the differences which still remained between the dominant 
power of the ‘Eastern bloc’ and its western satellites, a number of writers 
and scholars from the latter group tried to keep alive the idea that 
Communism was not the choice of their compatriots, but their imposed 
fate. Some even insisted, given that the West had been equally 
responsible for the drawing up of borders after the Second World War, 
that it was the West’s duty to help those countries come back to the world 
to which they naturally belonged. 
Milan Kundera, the famous Czech writer, is frequently mentioned as 
one of the forerunners of these appeals on behalf of Central Europe. 
Acknowledging his remarkable contribution to the debate, Tony Judt also 
adds, however, that: 
Kundera’s own writings had been anticipated, for example, by the Romanian 
Mircea Eliade, writing in Preuves, in Paris, in 1952: ‘these cultures [that is, 
those of Central Europe] ... are on the eve of their disappearance ... Does not 
Europe feel the amputation of a very part of its flesh? Because, in the end, all 
Elena Zamfirescu, “The Flight” from the Balkans’, RUSI Journal, December 
1994. 
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these countries are in Europe, all these peoples belong to the European 
community.3 
Given that Eliade’s worries had been voiced only seven years after the 
end of the Second World War, it is a reasonable supposition that his 
representation of Central Europe — one including his own country — 
was echoing the inter-war geopolitical representation of the area under 
consideration. Many writings from the inter-war period concerning 
Central Europe invariably include Romania within this area.4 
Indeed, some might be tempted to believe that Romania would have 
become Central European as a result of Transylvania’s integration into 
the united Romanian state, born at the end of the First World War. 
Although the historical act of 1 December 1918 has undeniably changed 
the country’s centre of gravity, it deserves underlining that Romania’s 
belonging to, as it were, central-Central Europe, that is, the area north of 
the Danube, was already recognized before the First World War. 
For example, in his 1910 book devoted to Romania,5 Alphonse 
Carpentier shared the view that she did not belong to the Balkans. Six 
years later, Otto Freiherr von Dungem noted that Romania was the link 
between the Balkans and the rest of Europe, adding that the Romanians 
did not recognize themselves as a ‘Balkan people’.6 Stressing in 1917 
that the Danube is the northern border of the Balkans, a Bulgarian 
academic, Anastase Ischirkoff, also confirmed, albeit indirectly, that 
Romania was a neighbour rather than an ‘inhabitant’ of the Balkans.7 
Furthermore, the map appended to Jovan Cvijic’s La Peninsule 
Balkanique8 clearly indicated that Romanian was situated ‘outside the 
area’. Published before the end of the war and well before the conclusion 
of the Trianon Treaty, the map showed that the northern border of the 
Balkans was delineated by the Danube and Sava rivers. 
Tony Judt, ‘The Rediscovery of Central Europe’, Daedalus, vol. 119, Winter 
1990, no. 1, p. 33. 
See Riccardo Riccardi, La Romania — monografia geografica, Rome, 1924; 
C.G. Rommenhoeller, La Grande Roumanie, ed. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 
1926; G. Peylavi de Fangeres, Roumanie, Terre Latine, Paris, 1929; Andre 
Tibal, La Roumanie, Paris, 1930; Emmanuel de Martonne, Geographie 
Universalle, vol. 4: Europe Centrale (Suisse, Autriche, Hongrie, 
Tchcoslovaquie, Pologne, Roumanie, series edited by P. Vidal de la Blanche 
and L. Gallois, Paris, 1931; Ernest Lemonon, La nouvelle Europe Centrale et 
son bilan economique (1919-1930), Paris, 1931, Ernst Schmidt, Dir 
rumanischen Staates in ihrer historiche Entwicklung, Munich, 1932; Eugen 
Pittard, Les races et Vhistoire, Paris, 1932; Andre Tibal, Les communications 
dans TEurope danubienne. Bulletin no. 8-9, Paris, 1933; Jacques Ancel, 
‘L’Europe Centrale, Paris, 1936; Mario Ruffini, La Romania e i romeni, Milan, 
1939. 
Alphonse Carpentier, La Roumanie modeme, Brussels, 1910, p. 3. 
Otto Freiherr von Dungem, Rumanien, ed. Friedrich Andreas Berthes, Gotha, 
1916, p. 3. 
Anastase Ischirkoff, Bulgarien, Land und Leute, Leipzig, 1917, p. 17. 
Jovan Cvijic, La Peninsule Balkanique, Paris, 1918. 
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Almost twenty years after the establishment of the ‘Eastern bloc’, 
there were books published referring to ‘the socialist republics in Central 
Europe’, with Romania included among these republics, as, for example, 
in Les republiques socialistes d’Europe Centrale.9 The other ‘socialist 
republics’ — Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia — were defined as 
Balkan countries. 
Three years later, a British author wrote: 
Romania is often described as a Balkan country. The term Balkans is, strictly 
speaking, the name of a range of mountains in Bulgaria and as such is not 
applicable to a geographical region. As popularized by historians and political 
writers, however, the term has come to designate the culture, political systems, 
and other aspects of a group of countries of Southeastern Europe. Still, if we 
characterize Romania as a Balkan country in this sense, we are not being 
strictly accurate. The most important historical influences that have helped to 
shape the Romanian state and its people have come as much from the north, 
west and east as from the south. It is logical to consider Romania part of 
Central Europe, with strong links to the ‘Balkan region’. But it may be more 
meaningful to associate Romania with Hungary, northern Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, and Austria than with Albania, Bulgaria and Greece ...10 
Like most of the Western authors who have no doubts about Romania’s 
belonging to Central Europe, J.M. Matley underlines that, besides her 
geographic location, there are also historical, cultural and political 
grounds for her association with states like Austria, former 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 
As for the post-1989 period, many sources still consider Romania part 
of the East or part of the Balkans. Nevertheless, an increasing number of 
books, studies and atlases have started to recognize Romania as part of 
central Central Europe. One of the most accurate portraits of Romania’s 
geographical location is to be found in Paul Magocsi’s impressive 
Historical Atlas of East Central Europe.n Explaining their choice of the 
term East Central Europe, the editors themselves recognize that it would 
be more precise to describe the territory they cover, which forms literally 
the central third of the European continent (traditionally considered to lie 
within the longitudinal boundaries of 10°W and 60°E),12 as Central 
Europe (10°E-35°E). 
As specified by its authors, the territory examined by the atlas is 
‘subdivided into three geographic zones: (1) the northern zone; (2) the 
Alpine-Carpathian zone; and (3) the Balkan zone’; and the contemporary 
physiognomy of the three zones is the following: the northern zone 
Andre Blanc et al., Les republiques socialistes d’Europe Centrale, Paris, 1967, 
p. 1. 
10 J.M. Matley, Romania. A Profile, London, 1970, p. 9. 
11 Paul Robert Magosci, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, Seattle and 
London, 1993. The Atlas is part of the multivolume History of East Central 
Europe published by the University of Washington Press. 
12 Ibid., p. xi. 
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‘encompasses former East Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine 
(west of the Dnieper River) and Moldavia’; the Alpine-Carpathian zone 
‘ roughly coincides with the lands of the historic Habsburg Empire (minus 
Galicia) before the mid-nineteenth century and the Danubian 
principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia [emphasis added]. Today this 
zone encompasses the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovenia, Croatia (north of the Kupa-Sava rivers), and 
northeast Italy’; the Balkans, ‘this formerly Ottoman sphere of East 
Central Europe’, includes today ‘the contemporary states of Croatia 
(south of the Kupa-Sava rivers), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and European Turkey’.13 
This description makes it very clear that: (a) ‘the Visegrad area’ is just 
a component of the geographic entity called (East) Central Europe; (b) 
the Balkans are part and parcel of the latter. Those who insist on ousting 
the Balkans from (East) Central Europe and respectively on ‘attaching’ 
Romania to the Balkans might be disappointed by this objective portrait 
of our part of the continent. The more so because — as indicated by its 
editors — the broad zones described by this historical atlas ‘have been 
determined as much by historical as by geographic factors’. In other 
words, those countries grouped together have in common something 
more than certain geographic features. It is obvious that, on the one hand, 
this recent work does not verify the notion that Romania would owe her 
Central-Europeanness to Transylvania alone. All her historical provinces 
have always belonged to either the northern or the Alpine-Carpathian 
zone of (East) Central Europe. On the other hand, Magocsi’s Historical 
Atlas recalls that, although the Ottoman Empire was the suzerain of the 
Danubian principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), unlike their south 
Danubian neighbours the latter preserved their sovereignty. 
As I have endeavoured to demonstrate, Romania has, throughout the 
twentieth century, been identified by numerous academics from both 
Europe and America as a Central European country. Or, more exactly as 
one located in, as it were, ‘central Central Europe’. One should consider, 
however, the views of earlier historians to see whether they further 
corroborate Romania’s claim to Central-Europeanness. 
Romania’s self-perception 
It is a legitimate question to ask whether Romanians themselves have 
ever perceived their country as a Central European one. Quoting the 
famous Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga, who preferred the term 
‘Southeastern Europe’, many Western academics have been able to reply 
that the idea that Romania would be a Central European country was 
alien to the mind of many Romanians. Leaving aside the fact that Iorga, 
in one of his papers published in 1935, amended this view and stressed 
13 Ibid., p. 2. 
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instead the Carpathian identity of his country, there is strong evidence 
that the way we define Romania after 1989 is neither a matter of fashion 
nor mimicry. On the contrary, we capitalize on a long tradition. 
In connection with this, it is useful to recall that the flame of the 1848 
revolutions did not bypass Romania. On the contrary, although not united 
yet, all her historical provinces took part in the ‘European spring of the 
peoples’ which had France and the Romanian Principalities as its 
respective western and eastern confines. While Romania’s southern 
neighbours did not experience that pathbreaking event, history’s clock 
was ticking at one and the same time for Romania and the other countries 
situated in the ‘northern tier’ of Central Europe. Had Romania owed her 
belonging to this specific area only to an event that was to take place 
seventy years later (1918), the other provinces would not have been 
affected by the revolutionary wave of 1848. But, according to accurate 
historical records, this was not the case. 
Voicing his conationals’ sense of belonging, Alexandru A.C. Sturdza 
complained, in 1904, about ‘the strange error of the French and German 
geographers in persistently confusing us, in every respect, with the 
transdanubian, Balkan countries and peoples’.14 While for Sturdza the 
Danube seemed to represent a separation line between the countries 
dominated by the Carpathians — the hallmark of Central Europe — and 
the Balkan ones, other prominent Romanians shared the notion that the 
Danube was a natural frontier within Central Europe. One example is 
offered by the proposal advanced during the autumn of 1918 by Take 
Ionescu, concerning the creation of a Central European confederation 
among the countries situated between Germany and Russia, and between 
the Baltic and the Aegean Seas. 
An indirect proof that seventy-five years ago the British mass media 
had not difficulty in recognizing Romania’s ‘Central Europeanness’ can 
be found in the pages of the issue of the Daily Telegraph dated 20 
October 1920. Explaining to its readers the reasons behind the French 
President, Millerand’s, decision to award to Take Ionescu (Romania’s 
Foreign Minister of the time) the Legion d’Honneur, the newspaper 
mentions, inter alia, ‘the ability of his opinions on all the problems of 
Central Europe’. More recently, a Czech political scientist recalled that 
Take Ionescu was one of the few designers of ‘non-German 
Mittleuropas’: 
During World War I a number of counter-schemes to the German Mittleuropa 
appeared. In 1918, for example, the Romanian premier Take Ionescu proposed 
to create an eighty-million-strong Central European confederation, formed by 
14 Alexandru A.C. Sturdza, La terre et la race. Roumaines depuis leurs origines 
jusqu’a nos jours, Paris, 1904, p. 7. 
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all states situated between Germany and Russia. Similar ideas were developed 
in T.G. Masaryk’s book New Europe (1918).15 
Following in Take Ionescu’s steps, Nicolae Titulescu also promoted 
the idea that the Danube linked, rather than separated, the countries 
crossed by it. When referring to Central Europe, however, he had in mind 
mainly the countries north of the Danube, tending to define Romania’s 
southern neighbours as Balkan states.16 By the time Titulescu was 
Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Romania was a party to both the 
Little Entente (comprising Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, 
and having — through Romania — special ties to Poland) and the Balkan 
Pact, two facts which emblematize her geopolitical position. In 1931 
Ernest Lemonon described this position as follows: 
Geographically and historically, Romania is a bridge between the West and 
the East ... Her role has to be, once again, one of co-ordination and 
rapprochement... Looked at from a Western perspective, she has to facilitate 
the relationship between the Danubian and the Balkan countries. Because she 
is the link between them. She has to rely on both the Danubian and the Balkan 
groupings. Romania could not belong to just one of them. But she is a 
necessary component in each of these groupings, in so far as she is the only 
country that can ensure the junction of the latter.17 
This assessment of Romania’s place and role in Central Europe is as true 
today as it was sixty-four years ago, and yet there is a tendency to 
mention Romania’s participation in the Balkan Pact, while omitting 
mention of her strong inter-war links with former Czechoslovakia and 
Poland. 
Romanians have never denied, however, their traditional links with 
the countries in the Balkans. Too long a history would mock them, if they 
dared such irreverence. To say nothing about geographic proximity. Yet, 
the important Balkan dimension of Romanian foreign policy is not 
explained by mere neighbourliness. It is a reflection of Romania’s 
enduring economic, political and cultural ties. It indicates the country’s 
direct and material interest in the fate of the Balkans as well as the 
willingness to make the most of her good relations with all her southern 
neighbours. That is why Romanians define their country today as one 
which is ‘close to’, and not simply ‘bordering on’, the Balkans. The more 
so because they are of the opinion that the term ‘Balkans’ should be seen 
less as designating a sort of ‘endless European disease’, and more as 
shorthand for South-Central Europe. 
With respect to Romanians’ perceptions of themselves in the inter-war 
period, it is useful to note that the academic world involved itself more 
15 Milan Hauner, ‘Germany? But Where Is It Situated?’, Perspectives. Review of 
Central European Affairs, Prague, Summer 1994, p. 31. 
16 See Nicolae Titulescu, Documente diplomatice, Bucharest, 1967, passim. 
17 Ernest Lemonon, La nouvelle Europe Central et son bilan economique (1919- 
1930), Paris, 1931, p. 212. 
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systematically in the debate about Romania’s geopolitical position during 
this period. Even Iorga was not outside the criticism of younger scholars 
who reproached him for the fact that his favourite term (i.e. ‘Southeastern 
Europe’) did not accurately reflect the position and the role he himself 
recognized as pertaining to Romania — that of a fundamental linchpin 
between the West and the East, and between the North and the South of 
the continent. Romanian academics strongly argued the case that 
Romania be considered part and parcel of Central Europe. In doing so, 
they succeeded — rather better than their Romanian predecessors and 
their foreign counterpart — in highlighting the very foundations of then- 
country’s role as a predestined bridge between the different parts of 
Central Europe.18 (The most comprehensive analysis is found in N.M. 
Radulescu’s Romania’s Geopolitical Position.19) 
During the years immediately after the Second World War, when the 
Soviet occupation troops were trying to impose an ‘eastern’ (even Slav) 
identity upon the country, it was mainly the Romanian diaspora in 
Western countries who denounced the cultural and historical crime 
commited against the genuine identity of their people. I have already 
mentioned Mircea Eliade. Another telling example is offered by a British 
book, published in 1956, in which Constantin Visoianu, a former 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, rightly points out in the introduction that: 
Of all the countries subjugated by Soviet Russia, it is Romania that is 
subjected to the heaviest pressure, it is Romania that is most ruthlessly 
exploited ... The explanation must be sought in a combination of 
circumstances. The Romanian people are of Latin origin, and Soviet Russia is 
only too well aware of the deep resistance stemming from this. The 
Romanians have always looked toward the West, and have always shown 
resistance to suggestions coming from the East.20 
18 See, for example, S. Mehedinti, Le pays et le peuple roumain, 1927; I. 
Simionescu, Tara noastra. Natura, oamenii, munca, Bucharest, 1938; Mihai D. 
David, ‘Probleme de ordin geopolitic ale locului §i ale spajiului ocupate de 
status roman’ in Considerapi geopolitice asupra Statului Roman, lap, 1939; M. 
Popa-Vere§, ‘Schema privind cercetarile geopolitice sub aspectul intereselor 
najionale’ in Geopolitica, Craiova, 1940; Ion Conea, Destinul istoric al 
Carpaplor, Bucharest, 1941; Ion Simionescu, Rumanien, Bucharest, 1942; Ion 
Conea, ‘O pozifie geopolitica’ in Geopolitica §i geoistoria, 1943, no. 3; C. 
Bratescu et al., Unitatea §i functiunile pamantului §i poporului romanesc, 
Bucharest, 1943; Vintila Mihailescu, ‘Romania — |ara de raspantie’ in 
Probleme de geografie romaneasca, Bucharest, 1944. 
Parts of these studies can be found in Emil I. Emandi, Gh. Buzatu, Vasile S. 
Cucu (eds), Geopolitica, vol. 1, lap, 1994. In reading them one needs, however, 
to sift the wheat from the chaff (some of them bear the stamp of the dubious 
geopolitical ideas and approaches characteristic of the inter-war period). 
19 N.M. Radulescu, ‘Pozipa geopolitica a Romaniei’ in Revista Geografica 
Romana, vol. 1, fasc. I, 1938. 
20 Constantin Visoianu, ‘Introduction’ in Captive Romania, ed. Alexandru 
Cretzianu, London, 1956, p. xv. 
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Given the stubborn efforts of Soviet hegemony to cut both the visible 
and invisible threads linking Romania to the West, and the fact that she 
was the only country in the ‘Eastern bloc’ surrounded by ‘brotherly 
states’, one can understand why, during the 1970s and 1980s, the voice of 
the Romanians was more muted than that of their peers in the area in 
reasserting their claim to Central Europeanness. One should add, 
however, that during the 1970s the academic world (particularly 
geographers and historians) had already made a start in amending the 
distorted picture of Romania.21 
Romania's choice 
Membership of Central Europe is not only about the geographic position 
of a given country, but about subscribing to the traditions, culture, 
political institutions and economic life of this region. Central Europe is 
that part of the Old Continent which, when offered the choice, opted for 
the values and the practices of the West. In other words, Central Europe 
is the continuation of Western Europe beyond the geographical borders of 
the latter, which explains why such countries as Germany, Greece, 
Austria or Finland — previously belonging to western, northern or 
southern Central Europe — have become intrinsic parts of the Western 
institutional framework. 
Central Europe is also about a sense of beloning and about political 
options. As a country whose institutional, political, cultural and economic 
life has been, with the exclusion of the Cold War years, an intrinsic part 
of the Western world, Romania’s desire to be included in Western 
institutions is a natural one. The clear and firmly stated goal of 
integration with the cardinal institutions of the West — the EU, the WEU 
and NATO — fully attests to the fact that we do not conceive of 
Romania’s capability to play a positive role in the construction of a 
network of democratic stability in Central Europe as a ‘given’, as 
something that would simply derive from her geostrategic position. On 
the contrary, we believe that this rile has much to do with our clear and 
irreversible option for democracy and free enterprise, and with the 
foreign policy options of post-1989 Romania. 
Romania’s option for integration with the European and Atlantic 
institutions enjoys the overall consensus of the political spectrum. 
Moreover, it is overwhelmingly supported by Romanian public opinion. 
According to the result of an opinion poll conducted last September, 83% 
of the respondents favoured membership in NATO, and 88% integration 
with the EU. At the same time, 62% of those interviewed found that 
Western investments in Romania were still wanting. Comparing these 
two sets of figures, one can see how the thrust for integration is not 
21 See, for example, V. Tufescu, ‘Presentation geographique de la Roumanie’ in 
Travaux de droit, d’economie, de sociologie et de science politiques, no. 80 — 
La Roumanie economique et culturelle, Geneva, 1970, and Eliza Campus, Din 
politico externa a Romaniei, 1913-1947, Bucharest, 1980. 
58 ROMANIA’S ROLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE 
rooted simply in a sort of naive fascination with the ‘glittering’ part of 
Europe. Carefully read, they equally reflect the destination chosen for 
Romania by her citizens, and their readiness to pay the price for the 
achievement of that goal. 
Our conviction that a significant American presence in Europe 
continues to be an irreplaceable asset for the stability and security of our 
continent is based both on the lessons of the past, and on the needs of the 
present. For reasons that are evident to all of us, the element of balance 
that can be provided by the United States is a guarantee that the vision of 
‘a new, integrated Europe of sovereign nations — a continent where 
democracy and free markets know no borders, but where nations can rest 
easy that their own borders will always be secure’ (Bill Clinton) will turn 
into the reality of tomorrow. 
Much has been said and written about a growing lack of American 
interest in Europe. In my opinion, this categoric verdict is corroborated 
neither by the efforts to adapt NATO to a new security environment and 
to its new roles, nor by the strong economic links between the USA and 
the European Union. The same goes for the recent decision of the US 
Department of State to rename the Office covering US relations with the 
countries situated between the Baltic Sea and the Black/Adriatic as the 
Office for Central European Affairs. Significantly, Romania is included 
among the countries belonging to the ‘northern tier’ of Central Europe. 
Romania's role 
As a riparian state on the Black Sea, with easy access to the 
Mediterranean, and to the Danube, Romania is a natural bridge between 
the West and the East, the North and the South. The more so, because she 
controls over 1,000 kilometres of the Danube’s navigable course as well 
as the Black Sea-Danube Canal, the relevance of which has been 
enhanced by the completion of the new Rhine-Main-Danube connection. 
Under these circumstances, it cannot be a surprise that the political 
stability and economic development of Romania is growmgly regarded as 
an asset for the larger area to which she belongs. 
There are several reasons which inform this perception. Romania’s 
internal stability made it possible physically to separate two zones of 
open or latent conflict. Her responsible, predictable international 
behaviour has been very helpful in preventing the mutual reinforcement 
of the eastern and respectively southern ‘arcs of crisis’. Romania has 
good relations with all the countries situated south of the Danube, 
including all the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. As a result, 
she has been able to offer a constructive contribution to the international 
efforts devoted to the achievement of a peaceful settlement to the 
conflicts in the area. Furthermore, bearing in mind Romania’s specific 
weight among the nations that are geographically close to this war, it is 
not difficult to understand why Romania is perceived as an important 
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stability factor for the Balkans. Looking beyond the conflicts of today, 
the daunting tasks of post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, 
especially in former Yugoslavia, will necessarily require the sort of even- 
handed and constructive attitude that has been the hallmark of Romania’s 
approach. 
Finally, Romania does not aim at comfortably positioning herself at 
the receiving end of any security arrangements in Europe. Commensurate 
with the country’s resources, military capabilities and comparative 
advantages in terms of strategic position and infrastructure facilities, 
Romania can, and is willing to, play the role of a security provider. 
In terms of foreign policy, Romania has sought evenhandedness on 
the part of Western states and institutions towards all the countries in 
Central Europe, drawing attention to the risks of perpetuating the 
traditional pattern of a zero-sum game behaviour among these states. 
Objectively, there is little reason to complain about Romania’s current 
status with the cardinal European and Atlantic institutions, so one might 
ask why the Romanians still insist on the necessity of non¬ 
discrimination? This balanced attitude has, at least, two main sources. 
Placed between the northern and the southern tier of Central Europe 
respectively, we are in a position to perceive more accurately than others 
the heavy costs of an additional fragmentation of an area already tom by 
centrifugal tendencies. Another source is a certain sense of responsibility, 
deriving from the fact that, next to Poland, Romania is the largest of the 
Central European countries that have a similar status with the EU, the 
WEU and NATO. 
Insisting on the risks of an artificial division of Central Europe, we 
also take into account the fact that the democratic stability of all the 
Western neighbours of Ukraine is a vital prerequisite for the maintenance 
and consolidation of that new independent state, whose geographic 
significance for the whole of Europe has become more and more 
apparent. 
It is for these and other equally solid reasons that we unreservedly 
favour the establishment of a reliable network of bilateral relations with 
all our peers in Central Europe, based on the pragmatic consideration that 
their democratic development and their economic consolidation is part of 
our own national interest. We regard this network of co-operation as an 
asset for our security and also as an important part of the ‘dowry’ 
Romania would like to bring to the Western institutions as a committed 
candidate and future active member. 
Conclusion 
In the last instance, what is at stake in the definition of today’s Central 
Europe is not the fate of this or that country, but Western values and 
practices themselves. It would be, without doubt, an irony of history if 
the Western world — whose determination to resist Communist 
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expansionism drew much of its stamina from its fundamental belief in 
democracy, the free market economy, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms — would waste this period’s unprecedented opportunity to 
extend them as far as possible. 
To limit Central Europe to only a few countries, and to rely only on 
their democratic development, is to commit a double fault. The first one 
is to do an enormous injustice to the other countries in that area, which, 
consistent with their historical traditions, have again, after 1989, turned 
their faces to the West. The second is to show a serious disbelief in the 
attraction exerted by the very foundations of the Western world, that is, 
democracy and free initiative, and thereby to accept the notion that 
pluralism, rule of law, respect for human rights, and the market economy 
should just be ‘historical accidents’ which occurred in certain quarters of 
the world. 
Finally, however unintentional, the linguistic division of Central 
Europe might make one think about a possible resumption of the policy 
of ‘spheres of influence’. 
7 
Who are the Moldovans? 
CHARLES KING 
The effort to construct new, post-Communist national identities is a 
common feature of political life in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.1 The relationship between these states’ post-Communist future 
and their pre-Communist past has become a topic of heated debate in 
parliaments and academic institutions throughout the region, and in many 
cases, rival political and cultural elites often employ abstruse linguistic, 
ethnographic or historical arguments as weapons of politics. 
The problem of defining what it means to be Moldovan, however, has 
had several unique twists. First, Moldova in its present borders has never 
existed as an independent political entity. Its fate has been inextricably 
linked to the histories of the early Romanian principalities, the Ottoman 
empire, the Russian empire, Romania and the Soviet Union. Today 
nation-building and state-building in the Republic of Moldova thus 
amount to the same thing. 
Second, given its historical ties with neighbouring states Moldova’s 
current borders are the subject of some controversy.2 Moldova is 
Romania’s foremost irredenta. Much of the present-day republic 
belonged to the Kingdom of Romania between 1918 and 1940, and 
parties across the Romanian political spectrum have touted the 
reincorporation of Moldova as essential to eradicating the legacies of the 
Communist period. In Moldova itself, such sentiments have given 
impetus to a reactive indigenous nationalism. Portions of the former 
An expanded version of this piece was published as the first chapter of 
Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition, London, 
1995. 
From the mid-fourteenth to early fifteenth centuries, an independent 
Principality of Moldova emerged in the lands between the Carpathian 
mountains and the Black Sea. By the early sixteenth century, however, the 
prinicipality had become a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. In 1812, the 
eastern half of Moldova — the ‘Bessarabia’ region located between the Prut 
and Dnestr rivers — was annexed by the Russian Empire, while the western 
half was incorporated into the newly created Romania after 1859. In 1918, 
political leaders in Bessarabia voted for union with Romania, and the region 
remained a province of the Romanian kingdom between the two world wars. 
In 1940, Bessarabia was annexed by the Soviet Union and united with a strip 
of land east of the Dnestr river — the ‘Transnistria region’ — to form the 
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, the predecessor of the current Republic 
of Moldova. 
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Principality of Moldova currently lie in Romania, the Republic of 
Moldova and Ukraine, and as an antidote to Romanian irredentism, some 
radical Moldovan nationalists have called for the incorporation of all 
these lands into a reconstituted ‘Greater Moldova’.3 The problem of 
Moldova’s national borders has so far been more the purview of poets 
than of politicians, but the lack of a regional consensus on the issue 
represents yet another potential source of instability in southeastern 
Europe. 
Finally, the question of the ‘true’ ethno-national identity of Moldova’s 
titular nationality remains the topic of bitter debate among local political 
and cultural elites. For many Moldovan intellectuals — a group whom I 
will label the ‘pan-Romanianists’ — the logical end of the national 
movement of the late 1980s and the creation of an independent Moldovan 
state in August 1991 should be reunion with the Romanian motherland. 
For this group, the pro-Romanian cultural reforms adopted after 1989 
were merely the first step in making Moldovan identity no more than a 
regional affiliation within an enlarged ‘Greater Romania’. 
Over the last few years, however, so-called ‘Moldovanist’ factions 
within the political and cultural establishment have increasingly 
challenged the basic assumptions of the pan-Romanianist camp. Some 
members of the local elite have benefited considerably from 
independence, and many are thus disinclined to sacrifice their positions 
for the sake of pan-Romanian national union. Many prominent figures 
now argue that, while Moldovans and Romanians may be linked by a 
shared history and language, the two nevertheless constitute two separate 
nations and should get on with the task of building two separate states. 
Moldovanist forces soundly defeated the pan-Romanianists in the first 
post-Soviet parliamentary elections (27 February 1994) and, since then, 
have succeeded in reversing many of the cultural reforms adopted after 
1989 — including a rejection of the Romanian national anthem and a 
resurrection of the concept of an independent Moldovan language.4 
The controversy over what it means to be Moldovan is, in part, a 
legacy of the Soviet period. Soviet cultural policy centred around the 
cultivation of a native Moldovan nationalism. In other republics, 
‘bourgeois nationalists’ were seen as a threat to the unity of the Soviet 
state, but in Moldova the subtle promotion of local nationalism provided 
an important guarantee of the stability of the Soviet Union’s western 
border after the annexation of the Bessarabia region in 1940. In order to 
shore up Bessarabia’s position within the Soviet Union, cultural policy 
See, for example, Moldovenii in istorie, Chisinau, 1993, the cover of which 
shows the boundaries of ‘Greater Moldova’. 
Debates between these two camps are explored in detail in Charles King, 
‘Moldovan Identity and the Politics of Pan-Romanianism’, Slavic Review, 53 
1994, 2, pp. 346-68. 
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centred around the notion of two separate ‘eastern Romance peoples’, the 
Moldovans and their cousins, the Romanians.5 
To outside observers, the national movement of the late 1980s seemed 
to be aimed at the rejection of Moldovan-Romanian separateness. The 
appearance of Romanian cultural symbols at anti-government 
demonstrations and the eventual adoption of the Latin script for the 
Moldovan language seemed to point towards the wholesale repudiation of 
Moldovan distinctiveness as mere Stalinist deceit, a linguistic and 
ethnographic fraud perpetrated in order to buttress the annexation of 
Romanian territory in 1940. As the New York Times described it, the 
national movement was no less than a mass ‘confession’ that, despite 
decades of Soviet propaganda, Moldovans were really Romanians.6 
However, to the surprise of many observers, the pan-Romanian 
euphoria of the late 1980s seems to have died away. Although public- 
opinion data are scarce, it seems that many Moldovans continue to insist 
that their national language and traditions are something other than 
Romanian. Many are willing to admit that they and the Romanians share 
certain cultural commonalities, but they jealously guard those traits which 
they see as uniquely Moldovan. The few public opinion surveys that have 
been carried out indicate that, when given a choice between the ethnic 
tags ‘Romanian’ and ‘Moldovan’, the republic’s titular nationality 
overwhelmingly opts for the latter.7 
While issues of economic reform and territorial separatism have 
plagued Moldovan policymakers since independence, the perennial 
question of Moldovan national and linguistic identity has been the main 
battleground of post-Soviet Moldovan politics. In the 1994 parliamentary 
elections, none of the major parties focused primarily on land reform or 
privatization; indeed, only parties with marginal support — such as the 
Social Democrats — attacked the more prominent parties for their failure 
to address serious issues of reform. Rather, it is the questions that have 
haunted Moldovan elites for most of this century that have continued to 
form the basis for post-Soviet political discourse: who are the 
On cultural policy during the Soviet period, see: Wim P. van Meurs, The 
Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography, Boulder, Colorado, 
forthcoming; Charles King, ‘Soviet Policy in the Annexed East European 
Borderlands: Language, Politics and Ethnicity in Moldova’ in Odd Arne 
Westad, Sven Holtsmark and Iver B. Neumann (eds), The Soviet Union in 
Eastern Europe, 1945-89, New York, 1994, pp. 69-93; and idem. The Politics 
of Language in Moldova, 1924-1994, DPhil dissertation, Oxford University, 
1995. 
New York Times, 25 February 1990. 
I am grateful to William Crowther (University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro) for sharing his intriguing and, as yet, unpublished data on this 
subject. In the first half of 1995, Stephen Whitefield (Oxford University) will 
be co-ordinating a high-n survey on ‘Ethnicity, Nationalism and Citizenship in 
the Former Soviet Union’ which promises to shed some light on 
‘Moldovanness’. 
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Moldovans? what language do they speak? what is their relationship to 
Romania? 
Certainly, Moldova’s major political groupings give radically 
different answers to these questions.8 But for all the differences between 
them, they are now in agreement on one basic point: that Moldova’s 
titular nationality really does seem to see itself, by and large, as 
something other than Romanian. The disagreements among these 
political forces — radical and moderate pan-Romanianist groups such as 
the Christian-Democratic Popular Front and the United Democratic 
Congress, and more Moldovanist factions such as the Agrarian 
Democratic Party and the Socialist Party — lie in how they account for 
this fact. 
The first is what might be called the ‘conspiratorial theory’ of 
Moldovan identity, a view put forward largely by the most radical pan- 
Romanianists, particularly the Christian-Democratic Popular Front. 
According to this view, most Moldovans, if left to their own devices, 
would undoubtedly embrace their Romanian heritage. They are prevented 
from publicly doing so, however, by political factors which perpetuate 
their state of subjugation, especially the power of the ruling Agrarian 
Democratic Party, the pro-Russian orientation of the powerful Socialist 
Party, the neo-imperialist economic policy of the Russian Federation, and 
the collective-farm system. Moldovans will not be truly liberated, on this 
view, until they can openly admit their ‘genuine’ ethnicity, and such a 
goal can itself only be reached through the destruction of the feudal 
relations between agrarian elites and the peasants that are perpetuated by 
the collective farm system and dependence on the Russian Federation. 
A second conception of Moldovan identity can be termed the 
‘denationalization theory’. On this view, Moldovans do in fact reject their 
putative ‘Romanianness’, but the repudiation of their true ethnicity has 
been the result of Soviet cultural policy. Moldovans thus suffer from a 
kind of false consciousness, a collective ethnic amnesia engendered by 
decades of Soviet efforts at destroying their sense of community with 
Romanians west of the Prut river. The entire thrust of Soviet 
historiography and linguistics was aimed at separating Moldovans from 
their ethnic confreres in Romania. According to the ‘denationalization 
theory’, Soviet policy was remarkably successful. Like the character in 
Chingiz Aitmatov’s famous novel [The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred 
Years], Moldovans have forgotten their past; they have lost touch with 
their genuine culture through the process of ‘mankurtization’ 
(.mancurtizare) fostered by the Soviets. The task of pan-Romanianist 
intellectuals must now be to awaken a sense of ‘Romanianness’ within 
the Moldovan population, a project that must be approached with caution 
8 A detailed analysis of political parties in post-Soviet Moldova is provided by 
Charles King, ‘Moldova’ in Bogdan Szajkowski (ed.), Political Parties of 
Eastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States, London, 1994, pp. 293-311. 
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lest any talk of immediate political union with Romania lead to the 
further alienation of an already misguided Moldovan populace. Public 
education, historical research and increased opportunities for travel and 
study in Romania are thus the most profitable paths for bringing 
enlightenment to the masses. 
It should not be surprising that most Moldovan historians and other 
professional academics, many of whom are affiliated with the more 
moderate pan-Romanianst United Democratic Congress, subscribe to this 
theory of Moldovan identity. Not only does the project of enlightening 
the Moldovan populace strengthen the position of writers and academics 
in Moldovan society, but it also serves as a kind of personal penance, 
with many academics now turning their attention to dismantling a 
separate Moldovan identity which they themselves helped create during 
the Soviet period. 
A final view of ‘Moldovanness’ is what might be termed the 
‘historical theory’. According to this view, Moldovans think of 
themselves as a different nation precisely because they are one. It is true 
that Moldovans and Romanians share common origins in Trajan’s Dacia 
and have had a long, if not always happy, existence together as the major 
representatives of eastern Latinity. But nevertheless, the Moldovan 
principality of the Middle Ages, the annexation of Bessarabia by the 
Russian Empire in 1812, the existence as a Russian imperial guberniia 
throughout the nineteenth century, the proclamation of an independent 
republic in 1918, the oppressive nature of Romanian rule between the 
wars, and the construction of a modem Moldovan state in the Soviet 
period have all contributed to the growth of a unique Moldovan nation. 
Such a view, though similar to Soviet discourse on Moldovan identity, 
is different insofar as it takes the briefly independent Bessarabian 
republic of 1917-18 as an important basis for the post-Soviet Moldovan 
state, a notion elaborated in a speech by Moldovan president Mircea 
Snegur during the electoral campaign of early 1994.9 The pan- 
Romanianists, according to this view, thus misunderstood the main 
significance of the national movement of the late 1980s. The popular 
street demonstrations and mass rallies of the period were an expression of 
a distinctly Moldovan (not Romanian) national identity, a fact confirmed 
in the rejection of pan-Romanianist parties in the February 1994 
parliamentary elections. It would betray the aims of the national 
movement and the purpose of the declaration of independence, say 
proponents of this theory, to trade the Soviet yoke for a Romanian one. 
What, then, are we to make of these three theories of Moldovan 
identity? Which gives the most accurate account of ‘Moldovanness’, and 
which best answers the question posed in the title of this paper. Who are 
the Moldovans? The answer I suggest, though perhaps intellectually 
9 Mircea Snegur, ‘Republica Moldova este |ara tuturor cetajenilor sai’, Pamint 
§i Oameni, 12 February 1994, pp,.l, 3. 
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unsatisfying, is ‘None of the above’. The reason is that all of these views, 
some of which have been mirrored in Western writing on Moldova since 
the 1960s, labour under the same misconception — that is, that humans 
have ‘true’ ethnic identities which can be objectively demonstrated 
through linguistic, historical or ethnographic research. If the massive 
literature on nationalism and ethnicity has demonstrated anything, 
however, it is that, in Ernest Gellner’s famous phrase, nationalism invents 
nations and not the other way around. Certainly, debates over the political 
malleability of ethno-national identity continue to rage among students of 
ethnicity and nationalism. But the idea that such identities are varied and 
overlapping, intensely personal, highly contextual, and often mutually 
contradictory is completely uncontroversial. 
This idea, however, has been as alien to internal debates on Moldovan 
identity as it has been to much of the Western literature on the region. 
Much of the literature has sought to ‘prove’ that, despite Soviet (and now 
post-Soviet) affirmations to the contrary, Moldovans and Romanians 
share a single ethnic and linguistic identity.10 However, it seems to me 
that rather than postulating a ‘true’ identity for the Moldovans and then 
explaining why they have or have not come to recognize it, we must 
begin any investigation of ethno-national identity — in Moldova or 
elsewhere — by accepting two rather pedestrian assumptions as 
fundamental: first, that a person’s ethnic identity is simply what he says it 
is; and second, that trying to convince him otherwise, whether through 
force of arms or force of argument, is doing politics rather than studying 
it. 
If these assumptions are indeed rather pedestrian, why have debates 
over the ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ of rival visions of ‘Moldovanness’ continued 
to be at the centre of popular discourse? There are three major reasons. 
The first is historical, or more precisely, historiographical. In my view, in 
order to understand the ongoing conflicts over Moldovan identity, it is 
crucial to understand the origins of Soviet cultural policy in Moldova, 
particularly in the Moldovan Autonomous Republic which existed 
outside Ukraine from 1924 to 1940. The MASSR, as it was known, was 
the germ of the enlarged Soviet Moldovan republic which emerged after 
The most representative book-length examples are Michael Brachis, Nations- 
Nationalities-People: A Study of the Nationalities Policy of the Communist 
Party in Soviet Moldavia, Boulder, Colorado, 1984; idem, One Step Back, 
Two Steps Forward: On the Language Policy of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in the National Republics (Moldavian: A Look Back, A Survey, 
and Perspectives, 1924-1980), Boulder, Colorado, 1982; Maria Manoliu- 
Manea (ed.), The Tragic Plight of a Border Area: Bessarabia and Bukovina, 
n.c., 1983; and Nicholas Dima, From Moldavia to Moldova: The Soviet- 
Romanian Territorial Dispute, Boulder, Colorado, 1991. 
Walter Feldman’s ‘The Theoretical Basis for the Definition of Moldavian 
Nationality’, published in Ralph S. Clem (ed.), The Soviet West: Interplay 
between Nationality and Social Organisation, New York, 1975, pp. 46-59, 
was perhaps the only Western work before the 1980s that did not explicitly 
condemn the notion of a distinct Moldovan identity as dubious and artifical. 
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the annexation of Bessarabia from Romania; as such, the MASSR 
provided a laboratory for the elaboration of a distinct Moldovan language 
and culture, a Moldova ‘in miniature’, as cultural cadres in the MASSR 
often termed it.11 In the past, the MASSR has been largely ignored or — 
more recently — denounced as the wanton seed from which the Stalinist 
fraud of a second eastern Romance language and people eventually 
sprang.12 As a result, very little research has been carried out on this early 
Moldovan republic, an inchoate Moldovan state in which many of the 
barricades that now divide political and cultural elites were originally 
erected. 
The second reason is methodological. In both the West and in Soviet 
Moldova itself, research which touched on the identity question was 
dominated by historians and historical linguists. In the case of the West, 
few political scientists, sociologists or sociolinguists had the requisite 
language skills or local contacts to carry out serious research on the 
region. The literature which emerged therefore lacked the analytical 
perspective which social scientific studies might have provided. 
Certainly, Western scholars provided an invaluable service by bringing to 
light the details of Soviet cultural policy in this often-forgotten comer of 
the USSR. But the fact that many approached studies of Moldova with an 
idee fixe concerning the submerged ‘Romanianness’ of the Moldovan 
people necessarily coloured research findings. 
In the case of Soviet Moldova, social science as it is generally known 
in the West was largely absent until the perestroika period. Moreover, 
given the senstivity of the identity question, history and linguistics were 
the most politicized of all academic disciplines, with scholarly arguments 
over mediaeval history or the pronunciation of fricatives serving as thin 
disguises for political disputes between the Soviet Union and 
Ceau§escu’s Romania. Unfortunately, these disciplines remain highly 
politicized in post-Soviet Moldova, and there is little evidence of serious 
social scientific work on the complexities of ethno-national identity. I 
remember a conversation two years ago with the director of Moldova’s 
National Institute of Sociology. When I asked him if the Institute planned 
to carry out public opinion surveys on ethno-national identity — at the 
time one of the most hotly debated topics in Moldovan political life — he 
responded that such an issue was the purview of historians and poets, not 
of sociologists. Any sociologist I know, however, would surely disagree, 
especially in the case of Moldova. 
V. Dembo, Sovetskaia Moldaviia i bessarabskii vopros, Moscow, 1925, p. 38. 
To my knowledge, the only detailed treatment of the MASSR ever published 
in the West is Klaus Heitmann, ‘Rumanische Sprache und Literatur in 
Bessarabien und Transnistrien (die sogenannte moldauische Sprache und 
Literatur)’, Zeitschrift fiir romanische Philologie, 81, 1965, pp. 102-56. My 
DPhil dissertation provides a detailed analysis of cultural politics in the 
MASSR based on newly opened Moldovan party archives. 
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The third reason is political. The term ‘identity politics’ is much in 
vogue at the moment to describe the irruption onto the political scene of 
social groups who demand not only a say in the political process, but 
something more basic: the recognition of their distinctiveness, something 
the philosopher Charles Taylor has termed a demand for ‘an 
acknowledgement of specificity’ or ‘the politics of difference’.13 
However, the fundamental fact about this recognition of difference — 
sexual, regional, ethnic, national — is that the identities that emerge from 
the process of recognition are inextricably linked to power (or a lack 
thereof). Feminists demand not only a recognition of women as a distinct 
social group (something which in itself is unproblematic), but also a 
commitment on the part of individuals and governments to empowering 
women (such as by offering paid maternity leave, equal pay for equal 
work, etc.). The situation is the same for other groups — ethnic 
minorities, homosexuals, the disabled — who see a recognition of their 
distinct identity as merely the first step towards social and political 
empowerment. 
To return to Moldova, political groupings offer radically different 
conceptions of ‘Moldovanness’ not because they are all motivated by 
some irrational nationalism, but because arcane debates over linguistics, 
historiography and ethnography represent a language through which 
Moldova’s rational political struggles are articulated. One need only 
peruse any issue of key Moldovan newspapers — the Writers’ Union 
organ Literatura §i Arta (Literature and Art), the Christian Democratic 
Popular Front’s Jara (The Country), the Republican Party’s Moldovanul 
(The Moldovan) or the Socialist Party’s Spravedlivost'/Dreptatea 
(Justice), to name a few — to see that, for both the pan-Romanianist and 
the Moldovanist camps, scholarship remains the handmaiden of politics. 
This is also the chief reason for believing that ‘Who are the 
Moldovans?’ will continue to be a question at the forefront of political 
discourse. For members of the current government, resurrecting a 
modified version of the Soviet view on Moldovan distinctiveness 
cements their positions of power by buttressing Moldovan independence 
against irredentist rumblings coming from Bucharest. Moldova under the 
Agrarian Democratic Party has, since early 1994, toyed with an idea 
taken as fundamental in most other East European states: that the most 
legitimate state is one founded on a nation, and that the most legitimate 
nation is one with its own language. Since the February 1994 elections, 
the Agrarian Democrats and their allies have turned to the task of shoring 
up both. 
Similarly, for members of pan-Romanianist groups, many of whom 
hold prominent posts in important cultural institutions, awakening the 
Romanian spirit in a somnolent peasantry will remain their primary 
13 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’, Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1992, pp. 38-39. 
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political task. Looking to the future, this bifurcation between the creative 
intelligentsia and the rest of Moldovan society is the greatest guarantor of 
the continued salience of identity politics. So long as Moldovan 
schoolchildren and university students continue to study literary 
Romanian, to take advantage of Romanian scholarships, and to explore 
the commonalities between both banks of the Prut, the question of ethno- 
national identity will remain one of the motors of the Moldovan political 
system. 
Of course, greater familiarity with Romania on the part of young 
Moldovans may not necessarily lead in the direction that pan- 
Romanianists would like; indeed, familiarity may breed contempt, since 
Moldovans sometimes encounter patronizing attitudes on the part of their 
brothers in Bucharest. Still, the growth of a new generation educated in 
the spirit of pan-Romanianism may portend monumental changes once 
these young Moldovans begin to vote. I may then wish to reconsider my 
answer to the title of this contribution. 
Notes on Contributors 
DENNIS DELETANT is Reader in Romanian Studies at SSEES. He has 
recently completed a study on dissent and coercion in Romania entitled 
Ceauyescu and the Securitate (London, 1995). 
CHARLES KING is the Rank and Manning Research Fellow in Social 
Studies at New College, Oxford. His articles on East European and post- 
Soviet politics have appeared in Foreign Policy, Slavic Review, The 
Christian Science Monitor, and a range of other publications in Britain, 
the US, Romania and Moldova. 
MAURICE PEARTON is an Honorary Visiting Fellow at SSEES. He 
was formerly Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, 
Cambridge University, and Reader in International Relations at 
Richmond College, London. He is the author of Oil and the Romanian 
State (Oxford, 1971) and Diplomacy, War and Technology since 1830 
(Kansas, 1984). 
MARK PERCIVAL is a PhD student at SSEES, working on British- 
Romanian relations 1944-65. He has published recently on British- 
Romanian relations in the 1970s (Contemporary European History, 
March 1995). 
IVOR PORTER worked with SOE during the war, was in the FCO 1946- 
73, and published Operation Autonomous, about wartime Romania, in 
1989. He is now working on a biography of King Michael of Romania. 
PETER SIANI-DAVIES is currently completing his doctoral thesis at 
SSEES on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. He is a frequent 
visitor to Romania and the author of various articles on the history of the 
country, including a forthcoming historiography of British writings on 
Romanian foreign affairs. 
ELENA ZAMFIRESCU is Counsellor to the Minister and Head of the 
Strategic Analysis Group in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Romania. 
She has published many articles in the field of international relations and 
has a volume on The Post-Cold War Central Europe forthcoming. 
70 


